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4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONSIDERATIONS
4.1. THREAT DESCRIPTIONS AND CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS
This section provides a brief description of severe emergencies that fall within each threat
category. The ideal response to these emergencies is also described in the concepts of
operations for these emergencies.
There are two operational concepts that apply when responding to all emergencies. First, the
response should operate under an integrated incident command system (ICS) as described in
Appendix 13. The most important characteristic of the ICS is that there should be a single
incident commander responsible for directing the response of all the organizations responding
to the radiological, conventional, and law enforcement aspects of the emergency. This
responsibility would typically be assigned to an individual in the organization with the
primary role during each phase of the response. As the emergency progresses, this would
typically pass from the operator or first responders to a local official and finally to a national
official or to a command group (composed of representatives of the facility and other
principal responders) for events involving several jurisdictions or ministries. The incident
commander should direct the response from an incident command post located near the
emergency.
The second general operational concept is that provisions should be made to promptly provide
useful and co-ordinated information to the public through the media. This is best done from a
single location (PIC, see Appendix 14). Attempting to provide information from several
locations or being slow, contradictory or secretive when providing information to the media
has resulted in loss of trust by the public. This, in turn, has resulted in considerable economic
and psychological harm. The public needs a plain language explanation of the risks, of action
they can take to reduce their risk and of action being taken to ensure that they and their loved
ones are safe and to protect their interests. It is important to realize that this applies to any
event perceived as a serious emergency by the public or the media.
4.1.1. THREAT CATEGORY I AND II FACILITY EMERGENCIES
THREAT DESCRIPTION
For reactors and facilities with large amounts of spent fuel or dispersible radioactive material,
the primary risk comes from atmospheric releases. For the most severe releases (general
emergencies — see Appendix 6) postulated at threat category I facilities, the risk of severe
deterministic health effects can only be substantially reduced by taking urgent protective
action in the precautionary action zone (PAZ) before or shortly after a release (see Appendix
5). For these emergencies and other general emergencies at threat category I and II facilities,
immediately instruct the public not to consume food that could be directly contaminated and
promptly initiate monitoring to determine if urgent protective action is warranted in the urgent
protective action planning zone (UPZ) to avert doses consistent with international guidance
(see Appendix 1). Deposition from severe releases warranting relocation or restrictions on
food consumption may occur at a considerable distance.
For facilities with the potential for uncontrolled criticalities, the direct external dose (shine)
from gamma and neutron radiation from a criticality dominates the hazard; airborne releases
are not significant. In the event of a criticality, prompt monitoring is necessary to determine if
urgent protective action is warranted in the UPZ.
In all these facilities, the off-site releases or doses from criticalities are not predictable with
any accuracy and the release could result in very complex dose patterns and contamination off
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