epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

2.2.6. TASK 3 — DEVELOP PLANNING BASIS
Once the threat categories of the facilities and jurisdictions have been established, it is
necessary to gather and document information about the possible emergencies and local
conditions (e.g. typical weather conditions) that must be considered before plans can be
developed. Appendix 9 summarizes the types of information needed. This information should
be documented and briefly described in the NREP. It should include a general description of
the nature of the possible emergencies addressed by the plan. Section 4.1 provides, for each
threat category, a general description of the emergencies that fall within that category. This
could be used as a model for the information in the plan concerning the nature of the threat.
Appendix 10 provides information on the time objectives that should form part of the
planning basis. A preliminary report (indicated by a in Figure 5) based on readily available
information should be quickly developed for use as input in the development of an interim
capability.
2.2.7. TASK 4 — DEVELOP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ALLOCATE
RESPONSIBILITIES
Develop a basic concept of operations describing the response process. Section 4.1 provides,
for severe emergencies within each threat category, a general concept of operations.
On the basis of the concept of operations, determine and assign the roles and responsibilities
of each group, organization or individual involved in emergency preparedness and response.
A list of critical responsibilities to be assigned is contained in Section 3.
Co-ordinators should be designated for each operator (facility), group, organization,
department and ministry that may have a role to play in emergency response.
Allocation of responsibilities is an interactive process and should be carried out in
consultation with each pertinent group, according to the realistic capabilities of that group.
The individual groups to which roles and responsibilities are assigned should agree to the
assignments and make a commitment to develop the necessary response capability.
A preliminary report (indicated by a in Figure 5) based on an assessment of the principal
response agencies should be quickly developed for use as input in the development of an
interim capability. This should include the concept of operations.
TABLE III. SUGGESTED EMERGENCY THREAT CATEGORIES FOR FACILITIES AND
PRACTICES
Threat
category
I
Criteria 14
Emergencies have been postulated that could result in severe deterministic health effects off site, to
including:
• reactors with power levels greater than 100 MW(th) 15 (power, nuclear ship and research
reactors 16 );
• spent fuel pools that may contain some recently discharged fuel and a total of more than
about 0.1 EBq of Cs-137 17 (equivalent to the inventory in a 3000 MW(th) reactor core);
• facilities with inventories of dispersible radioactive material sufficient to result in severe
deterministic effects offsite 18 .
14 Site-specific analysis can be performed to determine if the suggested threat category is appropriate.
15 Calculations [17] performed assuming core melt and early containment failure in a reactor with power levels less than 100
MW(th) under average meteorological conditions show that doses from 12 hours of exposure off-site (e.g.>250 m) do not
result in early deaths (acute bone marrow dose greater than 2 Gy).
16 Assumes the reactor has been operating at this power level sufficiently long to build up the I-131 inventory close to 10
PBq/MW(th) [17,18]. For research reactors, due to the great variety in their design and operation, a facility specific analysis
20