epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

that could contribute to similar overexposures in other States and report them to the IAEA. The
IAEA should inform other States of the facts that warrant their attention.
In a case of serious overexposure, interviews are conducted, pictures are taken and other
information needed to estimate the dose is gathered at the scene. Medical examinations and
blood tests are promptly performed to assist in estimating the dose. The IAEA may be
contacted to arrange for consultation with physicians with expertise in treating severe
overexposures. A course of treatment, based on the estimated dose received, is established in
consultation with the experts. The decision on treatment takes both the physical and
psychological suffering of the patient into consideration.
Terrorist threats or criminal activities
In a case of a terrorist or criminal threat, the party receiving the threat immediately notifies local
law enforcement, which contacts the national ministry responsible for assessing such threats. The
threat is assessed consistently with Appendix 17.
For a credible threat, an integrated response involving law enforcement and radiological response
elements will be implemented to prevent the act or to reduce its radiological, psychological and
economic impact. The response is implemented using the incident command system (ICS) under
the direction of an incident commander. In many cases teams with both law enforcement and
radiological response expertise will perform operational functions. In any case, the law
enforcement elements will be briefed on radiological and safety concerns and the radiological
elements will be briefed on law enforcement concerns (e.g. collection of evidence for nuclear and
classical forensics). The appropriate elements of the response needed to address law enforcement;
radiological, psychological and economic concerns will be activated/deployed. The response to
radiological concerns should be similar to that for public contamination emergencies.
For credible threats, local and national officials will promptly inform the public and media of the
realistic risks posed and the action they should take. Joint press briefings are given (at a joint public
information centre) periodically with participation by the law enforcement and radiological
response organizations in order to address the public’s concerns.
Threat category V
THREAT DESCRIPTION
Threat category V preparedness is for the area within the food restrictions planning radius 28 .
The Chernobyl accident resulted in contamination exceeding the international guidance on
food restriction at more than 1000 km from the plant site.
The staff of the affected (threat category I or II) facility should have declared a general
emergency (see Appendix 6) and notified the IAEA or the affected States before the plume
containing radioactive material arrives. However, the first indication of the emergency may be
the detection of airborne contamination. For some States the entire territory could be
contaminated at levels warranting restrictions on food and agricultural products. The pattern
and levels of contamination will be very complex, varying both temporally and spatially.
OILs for gross gamma dose rates from ground deposition can be used to identify areas where
locally produced food would likely be contamination in excess of the GAL (see Appendix 1).
28 The distance that could be affected by emergencies at a threat category I or II facility resulting in levels of ground
deposition necessitating food restrictions consistent with international standards (see Appendix 5).
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