epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Table II summaries the emergency preparedness arrangements that should be in place for each threat category. TABLE II SUMMARY OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ARRANGEMENTS BY THREAT CATEGORY Operator Arrangements to promptly: classify an emergency; mitigate the emergency; notify and recommend protective actions off the site consistent with international guidance; protect those on site; obtain off-site assistance; conduct environmental monitoring near the facility; and assist offsite officials in keeping the public informed. Operator Arrangements to promptly: classify emergency; protect those on site; inform off-site officials; obtain off-site assistance; conduct environmental monitoring near the facility to ensure that there are no off-site risks; and assist off-site officials in keeping the public informed. Operator (Dangerous mobile source) Arrangements to promptly: recognize an emergency, take action to protect the people nearby, mitigate the emergency, inform off-site officials of the risk; and provide technical assistance to off-site officials if needed. Farmers and food producers in food restriction planning radius Arrangements to promptly respond to official instructions to protect the food/water supply and control potentially contaminated food/water. Threat Category I and II Threat Category III Threat Category IV Threat Category V Off-site officials for the emergency zones Arrangements to promptly: implement urgent protective actions within the emergency zones; control consumption of contaminated food within the food restriction planning radius; provide emergency services to the facility; provide medical treatment to contaminated or overexposed victims; tell the public and media in plain language of the risk, and of the action they should take; and monitor and respond to inappropriate public reactions. Off-site officials – near the facility Arrangements to promptly provide emergency services; give medical treatment to contaminated or overexposed victims; confirm there are no off-site impacts; tell the public and media in plain language of the risk and of the action they should take; and monitor and respond to inappropriate public reactions. Off-site officials (National level) Arrangements to: inform (in advance) medical practitioners, scrap metal dealers and border crossings on the recognition and response to a radiological emergency; promptly make decisions on protective actions consistent with international guidance, assess and respond to a limited radiological emergency, tell the public and media in plain language of the risk, and of the actions they should take; report transnational emergencies to the IAEA; respond to IAEA notifications; and request IAEA assistance when needed. Off-site officials (Food restriction planning radius) Arrangements to issue instructions to protect the food/water supply and control potentially contaminated food/water, consistent with international standards. 7
2.1.3. AREAS AND ZONES For most emergency types, response takes place over two distinct areas. ON-SITE AREA This is the area surrounding the facility within the security perimeter, fence or other designated property marker. It can also be the controlled area around a radiography source or contaminated area. It is the area under the immediate control of the facility or operator. For transport emergencies or emergencies involving uncontrolled sources or localized contamination there may not be an on-site area defined at the onset of the emergency. However, during the initial response to these events the first responders or operator establish a security perimeter containing the inner- and outer-cordoned areas as shown in Figure 1 [11], thereby defining the on-site area, which is under their control. Appendix 5 provides suggested sizes for the inner-cordoned area for various radiological emergencies. OFF-SITE AREA This is the area beyond that under the control of the facility operator or first responders. For facilities with the potential for emergencies resulting in major off-site releases or exposures (threat categories I and II), the level of planning will vary depending on the distance from the facility. For these facilities, planning can be discussed for two emergency planning zones, as illustrated in Figure 2, and as described below and discussed further in Appendix 5. Precautionary action zone (PAZ) This is a predesignated area around a facility in threat category I is where urgent protective action has been preplanned and will be implemented immediately upon declaration of a general emergency (see Section 2.1.5). The goal is to substantially reduce the risk of severe deterministic health effects by taking protective action within this zone before or shortly after a release. Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) This is a predesignated area around a facility in threat category I or II is where preparations are made to promptly implement urgent protective action based on environmental monitoring data and assessment of facility conditions, the goal being to avert doses specified in international standards [3], as reproduced in Appendix 1. These zones should be roughly circular areas around the facility, their boundaries defined by local landmarks (e.g. roads or rivers) to allow easy identification during a response as shown in Figure 2. It is important to note that the zones do not stop at national borders. The size of the zones can be determined by an analysis of the potential consequences. Previous studies [12, 13] also provide a basis for generic zone sizes, as summarized in Appendix 5. 2.1.4. PLANNING LEVELS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Effective emergency response requires mutually supportive and integrated emergency planning at three levels: operator, off-site, and international. OPERATOR LEVEL The operator can be facility staff, or personnel using or transporting nuclear/radioactive material at the time of the emergency. They are responsible for: 8
Page 1 and 2: EPR- METHOD 2003 Method for Develop
Page 3 and 4: The originating Section of this pub
Page 5 and 6: EDITORIAL NOTE The use of particula
Page 7 and 8: 4.2.8. Managing the medical respons
Page 9 and 10: 1.2. OBJECTIVE This publication pro
Page 11 and 12: not appear for days, weeks or even
Page 13: TABLE I. FIVE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR
Page 17 and 18: National border Facility On-Site PA
Page 19 and 20: Typically, the operator declares a
Page 21 and 22: National (all hazards) emergency pl
Page 23 and 24: The co-ordinator should have in-dep
Page 25 and 26: (1) precautionary 9 urgent protecti
Page 27 and 28: 2.2.6. TASK 3 — DEVELOP PLANNING
Page 29 and 30: TABLE IV. EMERGENCY THREAT CATEGORY
Page 31 and 32: 2.2.12. TASK 9 — TEST CAPABILITY
Page 33 and 34: IDENTIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF CR
Page 35 and 36: 28 APPLICABLE CATEGORY THREAT CRITI
Page 41 and 42: 4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONSIDERA
Page 43 and 44: factors. Methods for compensation a
Page 45 and 46: Public exposure/contamination emerg
Page 47 and 48: exposure, protect the people nearby
Page 49 and 50: that could contribute to similar ov
Page 51 and 52: 44 4.2.1. Establishing emergency ma
Page 53 and 54: 46 A1 - ESTABLISHING EMERGENCY MANA
Page 55 and 56: 48 A2 - IDENTIFYING, NOTIFYING AND
Page 63 and 64: 56 A3 - TAKING MITIGATORY ACTION Th
Page 65 and 66:
58 A3 - TAKING MITIGATORY ACTION Th
Page 67 and 68:
60 A4 - TAKING URGENT PROTECTIVE AC
Page 69 and 70:
62 A4 - TAKING URGENT PROTECTIVE AC
Page 71 and 72:
64 4.2.5. Providing information, an
Page 73 and 74:
66 A5 - PROVIDING INFORMATION AND I
Page 75 and 76:
68 A6 - PROTECTING EMERGENCY WORKER
Page 77 and 78:
70 A6 - PROTECTING EMERGENCY WORKER
Page 79 and 80:
72 A7 - ASSESSING THE INITIAL PHASE
Page 81 and 82:
74 A7 - ASSESSING THE INITIAL PHASE
Page 83 and 84:
76 A8 - MANAGING THE MEDICAL RESPON
Page 85 and 86:
78 A8 - MANAGING THE MEDICAL RESPON
Page 87 and 88:
80 A9 - KEEPING THE PUBLIC INFORMED
Page 89 and 90:
82 A10 - TAKING AGRICULTURAL COUNTE
Page 91 and 92:
84 A10 - TAKING AGRICULTURAL COUNTE
Page 93 and 94:
86 4.2.11. Mitigating the non-radio
Page 95 and 96:
88 4.2.12. Conducting recovery oper
Page 97 and 98:
90 4.2.13. Authority (B1 elements)
Page 99 and 100:
92 4.2.14. Organization (B2 element
Page 101 and 102:
94 4.2.15. Co-ordination of emergen
Page 103 and 104:
96 B3- CO-ORDINATION OF EMERGENCY R
Page 105 and 106:
98 B4 - PLANS AND PROCEDURES Threat
Page 107 and 108:
100 B4 - PLANS AND PROCEDURES Threa
Page 109 and 110:
102 4.2.17. Logistical support and
Page 111 and 112:
104 B5 - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND FAC
Page 113 and 114:
106 4.2.18. Training, drills and ex
Page 115 and 116:
108 B6 - TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERC
Page 117 and 118:
110 B7 - QUALITY ASSURANCE Threat c
Page 119 and 120:
Appendix 1 GENERIC INTERVENTION AND
Page 121 and 122:
TABLE A1-III. GENERIC ACTION LEVELS
Page 123 and 124:
Appendix 3 EMERGENCY WORKER GUIDANC
Page 125 and 126:
Appendix 4 TYPICAL THREAT CATEGORIE
Page 127 and 128:
Fuel cycle Practice Uranium milling
Page 129 and 130:
Practice ≥ 2 100 MW(th) < 2 MW(th
Page 131 and 132:
Practice Lost /stolen dangerous sou
Page 133 and 134:
THREAT CATEGORY I AND II FACILITIES
Page 135 and 136:
(2) At these radial distances there
Page 137 and 138:
General emergency Emergency class d
Page 139 and 140:
Site area emergency Emergency class
Page 141 and 142:
Facility emergency Emergency class
Page 143 and 144:
Appendix 7 ACTION GUIDES FOR RADIOL
Page 145 and 146:
terrorist threats. — If public co
Page 147 and 148:
— If public contamination or expo
Page 149 and 150:
— If a device is found, implement
Page 151 and 152:
command, operational safety, public
Page 153 and 154:
— Conduct an investigation, in cl
Page 155 and 156:
Damaged dangerous source Descriptio
Page 157 and 158:
contaminated/exposed individuals an
Page 159 and 160:
— Activate response using the ICS
Page 161 and 162:
Radioactive satellite re-entry Radi
Page 163 and 164:
Nuclear weapons accident Descriptio
Page 165 and 166:
— Co-ordinate with the State resp
Page 167 and 168:
— Evaluate all available informat
Page 169 and 170:
Element A2.15). Incident investigat
Page 171 and 172:
— Notify potentially affected Sta
Page 173 and 174:
— Assess likely exposures of publ
Page 175 and 176:
— Ensure operational guidance (OI
Page 177 and 178:
Explosive radiological dispersal de
Page 179 and 180:
needed (see Element A9.1) 77 . Radi
Page 181 and 182:
— If a dangerous source is to be
Page 183 and 184:
Intentional contamination of food/p
Page 185 and 186:
• securing the scene against poss
Page 187 and 188:
Appendix 8 DANGEROUS QUANTITIES OF
Page 189 and 190:
Sources and material 105 Radionucli
Page 191 and 192:
Appendix 9 INFORMATION NEEDS FOR TH
Page 193 and 194:
Appendix 10 RESPONSE TIME OBJECTIVE
Page 195 and 196:
Appendix 11 URGENT PROTECTIVE ACTIO
Page 197 and 198:
A12.1 NATIONAL RADIATION EMERGENCY
Page 199 and 200:
2.6 Response communications (see El
Page 201 and 202:
accomplished by use of a single spo
Page 203 and 204:
List all major ministries and agenc
Page 205 and 206:
A12.2 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS O
Page 207 and 208:
implementing procedures that will b
Page 209 and 210:
3.12 Financing operations See the o
Page 211 and 212:
A12.3 FACILITY (ON-SITE) EMERGENCY
Page 213 and 214:
3.1 Notification, activation and re
Page 215 and 216:
4.7 Exercises 4.8 Quality assurance
Page 217 and 218:
2. NORMAL STANDING INSTRUCTIONS 2.1
Page 219 and 220:
10. STEPS (ACTIONS) List steps and
Page 221 and 222:
Unity of command, where each person
Page 223 and 224:
Incident Commander (e.g. Fire Briga
Page 225 and 226:
planning for the long term and reco
Page 227 and 228:
The medical and radiation protectio
Page 229 and 230:
(1) command functions as part of th
Page 231 and 232:
TABLE A14-I. RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY
Page 233 and 234:
Facility/ location Functions Charac
Page 235 and 236:
Appendix 15 EMERGENCY RADIATION RES
Page 237 and 238:
A15.1 OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY RADIA
Page 239 and 240:
A15.2 SUGGESTED SPECIFICATIONS FOR
Page 241 and 242:
DET: DECONTAMINATION TEAM Expertise
Page 243 and 244:
PST: IN-PLANT SURVEY TEAM Expertise
Page 245 and 246:
LAB: LABORATORY FACILITIES - TEAM A
Page 247 and 248:
The actual facilities, equipment an
Page 249 and 250:
Appendix 17 CATEGORIZATION OF TERRO
Page 251 and 252:
TABLE A17-I PROPOSED TERRORIST/CRIM
Page 253 and 254:
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENTS A/D< 0.01
Page 255 and 256:
cleaned up would depend on many fac
Page 257 and 258:
[15] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AG
Page 259 and 260:
[55] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AG
Page 261 and 262:
ends when the situation is under co
Page 263 and 264:
and directly (without further asses
Page 265 and 266:
(4) A discovery of the loss or illi
Page 267 and 268:
RAB RDD RF RMAC SPDS SRF T TLD TSC
Page 269 and 270:
BENCHMARKS FOR INHALATION AI.5 Sele
Page 271 and 272:
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Page 273:
da Silva, F. Sinkko, K.T.S. Smith,
show all

epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?