epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

TABLE IV. EMERGENCY THREAT CATEGORY FOR GOVERNMENT
JURISDICTIONS
I
Threat
category
II
III
Local planning is warranted for
jurisdictions
Responsible for urgent protective actions
within the PAZ 24 and UPZ of a threat category
I facility.
Responsible for urgent protective actions
within the UPZ of a threat category II facility.
Responsible for providing emergency services
to a threat category III facility, including fire
fighting, police and medical.
IV All All
V
With farming or food processing facilities
and/or responsible for taking local actions for
agricultural and ingestion control within food
restriction planning 24 radius for a threat
category I or II facility.
National planning is warranted for
States
With territory within the PAZ, UPZ or
food restriction planning radius of threat
category I facilities.
With territory within the UPZ or food
restriction planning radius of a threat
category II facility.
Containing a threat category III facility.
With territory within food restriction
planning 24 radius for a threat category I
or II facility to include those located in
other States. .
2.2.8. TASK 5 – DEVELOP INTERIM CAPABILITY
The full implementation of the NREP can be a long process, which involves writing
procedures, training staff and holding drills and exercises. In order to ensure that a response
capability is in place before the NREP can be fully implemented, an interim emergency
response capability should be established. The purpose is to provide an improved response to
emergencies until the full plan can be implemented. This interim capability does not need to
be optimal. This means that, in the interest of quickly developing this interim capability, it
will probably be necessary to make do with available means and resources, and with only
minimal additional arrangements (e.g. training).
Concentrate on using existing capabilities effectively and efficiently. This involves ensuring
that decisions can be made quickly and that existing capabilities (e.g. communication
systems, monitoring personnel, and public information offices) are identified and provisions
are made (e.g. central contact point) for quickly accessing them. An interim means for coordination
of a large response involving several ministries and or jurisdictions should also be
established (e.g. a response work group).
This should include starting the process of correcting any critical flaws that can be addressed
quickly for facilities within threat category I and II and ensuring that decisions can be made
quickly. In addition, developing a national capability for dealing with category IV threats
should be started and should include: establishing a notification point where potential
radiation emergencies can be reported and assistance obtained (see Section 4.2, Element
A2.1); providing first responders (e.g. fire brigades and police) with guidance concerning
recognition and immediate response to a radiation emergency 25 (see Section 4.2, Element
A2.3); and providing physicians and hospitals with information on recognizing and reporting
radiation induced injuries. Finally, a warning point for receipt of IAEA notifications should
be established (see Section 4.2, Element A2.14).
24 See Appendix 5 for information on emergency zone size and food restriction planning radius.
25 This guidance should address radiological emergencies (See Appendix 7).
22