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Annex BACKGROUND FOR D VALUES IN APPENDIX 8 AI.1 The Requirements [2] define a dangerous source as one “that could, if not under control, give rise to exposure sufficient to cause severe deterministic effects”. The requirements go on to define a severe deterministic effect as one that “is fatal or life threatening or results in a permanent injury that decreases the quality of life”. Table A8-I provides values for the quantities of material that, if not controlled, should be considered a ‘dangerous source’. AI.2 In determining quantities that should be treated as dangerous sources we considered the reasonable exposure routes or scenarios that could result in human exposures if control over a source was lost. These scenarios and assumptions were developed taking account of past experience and relevant concerns such as acts of terrorism. EMERGENCY EXPERIENCE AI.3 A review of the <strong>IAEA</strong> reports involving lost or stolen sources is summarized in table AI-I below. The table does not include an event involving leaving a 0.13 TBq Ir-192 brachytherapy source in a patient for 4 days resulting in her death [58]. AI.4 The smallest uncontrolled source, relative to the D values in Table A8-I, to result in an injury that reduced the quality of life due to external exposure was a 0.12 to 0.16 TBq Cs-137 source [49] This is just slightly larger than the D 1 value of 0.10 TBq for Cs-137 in Table A8-I. The smallest uncontrolled source that resulted in fatal exposure among the public was a 1.2 TBq Ir-192 source [50]. This is about ten times the D 1 value. The only death from intake was from the intake of 10 -5 of the very dispersible material in a Cs-137 source [39]. This is one tenth of the intake fraction assumed in calculation of the D 2 values. Therefore it appears that the criteria for defining dangerous sources are consistent with the accident experience. TABLE AI-I SUMMARY OF LOST OR STOLEN SOURCE EMERGENCIES Emergencies Emergency Source A 149 (TBq) D 148 1 (TBq) A/D 1 Health Consequences Istanbul [51] Co-60 23.5 0.03 783 Severe injury - life threatening Samut Prakarn [52] Co-60 15 0.03 500 3 deaths Tammiku [53] Cs-137 7.4 0.1 74 1 death Goiânia [39] Cs-137 50 0.1 500 4 deaths Lilo [49] Cs-137 0.164 0.1 1.6 Severe injury Lilo [49] Cs-137 0.126 0.1 1.3 Severe injury Yanango [54] Ir-192 1.37 0.08 17.1 Severe injury - life threatening Gilan [55] Ir-192 0.185 0.08 2.3 Severe injury Case 20 [50] Ir-192 1.2 0.08 13.8 8 deaths Case 37 [50] Ir-192 0.26 0.08 3.3 Severe injury Case 43 [50] Ir-192 0.3 0.08 3.8 Severe injury Georgia RTGs Sr-90 1000 4 250 Severe injury- life threatening 148 D 1 for the radionuclide involved 149 Activity (TBq) involved in the emergency. 263
BENCHMARKS FOR INHALATION AI.5 Selection of proper D 2 values requires knowledge of the possible deterministic effects of internally deposited radionuclides. In contrast to deterministic effects from external radiation sources, there is very little information available on deterministic effects in human subjects from intake of radionuclides. A meeting of consultants was held to review the use of data on deterministic effects in laboratory animals to independently verify, in benchmark calculations, some of the D 2 values calculated. Models were used for deterministic health effects that were based on effects seen in life-span studies in dogs and rats [56,57]. The consultants focused on radiation pneumonitis/pulmonary fibrosis as the deterministic effect of interest for inhaled radionuclides because it would be the most likely cause of a permanent injury that decreases in the quality of life. Benchmark calculations were made for a number of r<strong>epr</strong>esentative radionuclides using basic principles from these models and doses calculated to the alveolar-interstitial (AI) region of the lung. The calculations estimated, assuming an intake faction of 10 -4 , the activity (TBq) that would result in an approximate threshold (5%) for morbidity from radiation pneumonitis/pulmonary fibrosis. Table AI-II compares these benchmark D 2 values with the D 2 values from Table A8-I. Generally speaking, there is good agreement between the two sets of D 2 values for alpha- and beta, gamma-emitting radionuclides. AI.6 A second set of calculations examined whether the criterion of 6 Gy to the lung in 2 days is an appropriate way to consider the chronic irradiation patterns for various beta, gamma-emitting radionuclides in the AI region. This was needed because of the broad range of effective retention and physical half-lives that might be involved. The consultants looked at several long-lived beta, gamma-emitting radionuclides. A different dose criterion, a cumulative absorbed dose of 75 Gy to the AI region in 1 year, was considered because it could lead to an approximate 5% morbidity level from radiation pneumonitis/pulmonary fibrosis. Table AI-III gives the results of these benchmark D 2 values compared with the Table A8-I values. Again, the two sets of numbers agree within factors of 2 or 3. AI.7 These benchmark calculations indicate that the Table A8-I values that have been examined are consistent within factors of 1 to 5 of values derived from the best currently available models on deterministic health effects in the lung. In most cases the D 2 values in Table A8-I appear to be slightly conservative. TABLE AI-II. COMPARISON OF TABLE A8-I D 2 VALUES WITH VALUES CALCULATED FROM MODELS FOR RADIATION PNEUMONITIS/PULMONARY FIBROSIS (AI, TYPE S). Nuclide Table A8-I Benchmark Beta, Gamma Emitters Sr-90 1 4.7 Ce-144 9 63 Cs-134 30 30 Co-60 30 25 Alpha Emitters Pu-238 0.06 0.08 Pu-239 0.06 0.08 Pu-240 0.06 0.08 Am-241 0.06 0.08 264
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EPR- METHOD 2003 Method for Develop
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The originating Section of this pub
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EDITORIAL NOTE The use of particula
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4.2.8. Managing the medical respons
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1.2. OBJECTIVE This publication pro
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not appear for days, weeks or even
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TABLE I. FIVE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR
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2.1.3. AREAS AND ZONES For most eme
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National border Facility On-Site PA
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Typically, the operator declares a
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National (all hazards) emergency pl
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The co-ordinator should have in-dep
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(1) precautionary 9 urgent protecti
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2.2.6. TASK 3 — DEVELOP PLANNING
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TABLE IV. EMERGENCY THREAT CATEGORY
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2.2.12. TASK 9 — TEST CAPABILITY
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IDENTIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF CR
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28 APPLICABLE CATEGORY THREAT CRITI
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4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONSIDERA
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factors. Methods for compensation a
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Public exposure/contamination emerg
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exposure, protect the people nearby
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that could contribute to similar ov
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44 4.2.1. Establishing emergency ma
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46 A1 - ESTABLISHING EMERGENCY MANA
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48 A2 - IDENTIFYING, NOTIFYING AND
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56 A3 - TAKING MITIGATORY ACTION Th
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58 A3 - TAKING MITIGATORY ACTION Th
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60 A4 - TAKING URGENT PROTECTIVE AC
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62 A4 - TAKING URGENT PROTECTIVE AC
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64 4.2.5. Providing information, an
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66 A5 - PROVIDING INFORMATION AND I
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68 A6 - PROTECTING EMERGENCY WORKER
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70 A6 - PROTECTING EMERGENCY WORKER
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72 A7 - ASSESSING THE INITIAL PHASE
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74 A7 - ASSESSING THE INITIAL PHASE
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76 A8 - MANAGING THE MEDICAL RESPON
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78 A8 - MANAGING THE MEDICAL RESPON
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80 A9 - KEEPING THE PUBLIC INFORMED
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82 A10 - TAKING AGRICULTURAL COUNTE
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84 A10 - TAKING AGRICULTURAL COUNTE
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86 4.2.11. Mitigating the non-radio
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88 4.2.12. Conducting recovery oper
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90 4.2.13. Authority (B1 elements)
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92 4.2.14. Organization (B2 element
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94 4.2.15. Co-ordination of emergen
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96 B3- CO-ORDINATION OF EMERGENCY R
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98 B4 - PLANS AND PROCEDURES Threat
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100 B4 - PLANS AND PROCEDURES Threa
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102 4.2.17. Logistical support and
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104 B5 - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND FAC
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106 4.2.18. Training, drills and ex
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108 B6 - TRAINING, DRILLS AND EXERC
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110 B7 - QUALITY ASSURANCE Threat c
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Appendix 1 GENERIC INTERVENTION AND
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TABLE A1-III. GENERIC ACTION LEVELS
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Appendix 3 EMERGENCY WORKER GUIDANC
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Appendix 4 TYPICAL THREAT CATEGORIE
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Fuel cycle Practice Uranium milling
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Practice ≥ 2 100 MW(th) < 2 MW(th
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Practice Lost /stolen dangerous sou
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THREAT CATEGORY I AND II FACILITIES
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(2) At these radial distances there
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General emergency Emergency class d
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Site area emergency Emergency class
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Facility emergency Emergency class
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Appendix 7 ACTION GUIDES FOR RADIOL
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terrorist threats. — If public co
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— If public contamination or expo
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— If a device is found, implement
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command, operational safety, public
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— Conduct an investigation, in cl
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Damaged dangerous source Descriptio
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contaminated/exposed individuals an
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— Activate response using the ICS
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Radioactive satellite re-entry Radi
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Nuclear weapons accident Descriptio
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— Co-ordinate with the State resp
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— Evaluate all available informat
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Element A2.15). Incident investigat
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— Notify potentially affected Sta
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— Assess likely exposures of publ
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— Ensure operational guidance (OI
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Explosive radiological dispersal de
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needed (see Element A9.1) 77 . Radi
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— If a dangerous source is to be
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Intentional contamination of food/p
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• securing the scene against poss
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Appendix 8 DANGEROUS QUANTITIES OF
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Sources and material 105 Radionucli
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Appendix 9 INFORMATION NEEDS FOR TH
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Appendix 10 RESPONSE TIME OBJECTIVE
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Appendix 11 URGENT PROTECTIVE ACTIO
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A12.1 NATIONAL RADIATION EMERGENCY
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2.6 Response communications (see El
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accomplished by use of a single spo
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List all major ministries and agenc
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A12.2 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS O
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implementing procedures that will b
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3.12 Financing operations See the o
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A12.3 FACILITY (ON-SITE) EMERGENCY
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3.1 Notification, activation and re
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4.7 Exercises 4.8 Quality assurance
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Page 271 and 272: CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Page 273: da Silva, F. Sinkko, K.T.S. Smith,
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