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4.2.4. Taking urgent protective action (A4 elements)
Response objectives:
(1) To take all appropriate measures to save lives (4.41).
(2) To take urgent protective actions, in compliance with international standards, to avoid severe deterministic health effects and avert doses
(4.42).
(3) To modify urgent protective actions, as appropriate, in the light of any new information relating to the emergency that becomes available
(4.43).
(4) To discontinue a protective action when it is no longer justified (4.44).
A4 – TAKING URGENT PROTECTIVE ACTION Threat category Responsibility
Elements I II III IV V O L N
A4.1 Establish optimized national intervention levels to take urgent protective actions in compliance with
international standards, taking into account local and national conditions, such as:
1) the individual and collective doses to be averted by the intervention; and
2) the radiological and non-radiological health risks and the financial and social costs and benefits
associated with the intervention (4.45).
Scientifically based recommendations for implementing countermeasures should be accompanied by an
explanation that enables the public and decision makers to understand them, reasonably consider them
and explain them to the other stakeholders. The explanation must make it clear to people that it ensures
their “safety” and that of all other family members, including unborn children. Therefore, along with the
criteria there should be a common language statement defining “safe”. This explanation should be tested
on representative members of the intended audience.
The intervention levels should be consistent with the international standards contained in Refs. [2,3]
reproduced here in Appendix 1. The existing generic intervention levels (GILs) for evacuation in the
international standards [2,3] are for good travel conditions; however, evacuation or substantial shelter
should always be implemented if the acute dose to an organ approaches or exceeds the dose levels in
Appendix 2. The use of the inhalation committed effective dose factors from Refs. [2,3], which are for a
lifetime (50–70 years), is inappropriate in calculating the acute dose.
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