epr-method (2003) - IAEA Publications - International Atomic Energy ...

(1) precautionary 9 urgent protective action to prevent severe deterministic health effects by
keeping doses below those for which intervention would be expected to be undertaken
under any circumstances 10,11 ;
(2) urgent protective action to prevent stochastic health effects by averting doses, in
accordance with international standards 12 ;
(3) agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures for ingestion and longer term protective
measures, in accordance with international standards 12 ; or
(4) protection for the workers responding (undertaking an intervention), in accordance with
international standards 13 .
A minimal threat assessment could be accomplished by identifying:
(1) the threat category of facilities within the State, based on Table III and Appendix 4;
(2) any national territory that is within the emergency zones or food restriction planning
radius (see Appendix 5) of the threat category I and II facilities within or outside the
State
(3) the threat category of the jurisdictions within the State, based on Table IV; and
(4) the operators of dangerous mobile sources (threat category IV in Table I) that can result
in emergencies anywhere in the State.
This threat assessment for facilities can be based on the results of generic accident studies [12,
13] as summarized in Tables III and IV. This is generally sufficient for the emergency
planning process. If a detailed analysis is to be performed, it should consider a range of
potential emergencies and not be limited to “design basis” accidents.
The threat assessment should also identify significant non-radiological threats (e.g. UF 6 or
other hazardous chemical releases) to the people on and off site associated with the facility.
A minimum level of threat (threat category IV in Table I) should be assumed to exist for all
jurisdictions. Therefore States should assess their vulnerability to emergencies that can occur
anywhere. This should include:
(1) what types of radioactive material shipments have passed through the State, and the
main routes and focal points (e.g. distribution centres). The system used to identify such
shipments and the current level of training provided to carriers and first responders
should also be characterized [16];
(2) uses of dangerous mobile sources (e.g. for medical or industrial uses). This should
include the system to ensure their control and proper disposal; and
(3) the locations at which there is a significant probability of encountering a dangerous
source that has been lost, abandoned, stolen or illicitly transported. This should include
large scrap metal processing facilities and national border crossings.
9 Initiated on the basis of conditions at the facility before environmental monitoring is carried out.
10 Schedule IV of Ref. [3], reproduced in Appendix 2.
11 Including events with a very low estimated probability of occurrence.
12 Schedule V of Ref. [3], reproduced in Appendix 1.
13 Appendix V, paras V.27–V.32 of Ref. [3], summarized in Appendix 3.
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