ABHISAMAYALAMKARA

° -—
376 ANALYSIS OF
[Abhis. aloka, MS. 248b. 3-9.] |—
[Gser. IV. 73b. 5-6.] hphags~pa-rnams~kyi sems
hdod-chags dah-bral-ba dan ze-sdah dan gii-mug danbral-ba-rnams
spros-bral-du-ses-pa. 1
9. The Bodhisattava's knowledge about the Buddha's
cognition of individual minds as u b i q u i t o u s,
inasmuch as they are merged in the
Absolute,
[Abhis. aloka, MS. 249b. 16-250a. 10.
f%rrfr
(i v. 15b.)
[Gser. IV. 73b. 6~74a, 1.] chos-kyi-dbyins-kyi ho-bonid-kyh
sems rgya-chen-po ses-pa. 2
10. The Bodhisattva's knowledge about the Buddha's
cognition of the minds as representing one
great whole 3 through the fact of their being allpervading
or otherwise because all the individual minds
are equal, being undifferentiated from the standpoint of
the Absolute. On the other hand, in the aspect of
Empirical Reality, in their illusdry character, they are
rJso equal, since each of them is the source of every moral
virtue.
[Abhis. aloka, MS. 250b. 1-6.]
f 3WTf rf
(IV. 15c.)
[Gser. IV. 74a. 3-4.] khyab-par~byed-pas sems
chen-poham yan-na sems chen~por-gyur-pahi donni
1 Pane, III. 57a. 2-5.—hdod-chags-dan-bral-bahi sems etc.—
Asf. 258. 20-259. 6.—
2 Pane. Ill 58a. 6-7.—Rab-hbyor gzan-yan de~bzin-gsegs-pa serphyin
zab-mo hdi-la brten-te sems-can pha-rol dan. gan-zag pha-rolgyi
sems rgya-cheba-la sems rgya-che-ba zes-bya-bar yan~dag-pa }i-
Ita-ba-bzin-du rab-tu-mkhyen-to. Ast. 263. 6—10 sqq.
3 Cf, ''Doctrine of Pr. par." p. 55.
THE ABHISAMAYALAMKARA 377
mnam-pa yin~la de yah sems-can thams-cad don-dam-par
bdag-med-pa dan tha-snad-du sgyu-ma-lta-buhi no-bosyon-tan
thob-pahi rten-du mnam-par-ses-pa. 1
11. The Bodhisattva's knowledge about the Buddha's
cognition of the immeasurableness of
the minds, inasmuch as it is impossible to apply to
them any calculation or measure, since there is no objective
world, corresponding to each of them separately.
[Abhis. aloka, MS. 250b. 6-8.] ^WlTOf^T^R I...
(IV. 15c.)
[Gser. IV. 74a. 4-5.] hjug-yul-gyi rten 2 so-sor hes-pa
med-pas grans dan tshad-kyis gzal mi-nus-pas sems
tshad~med-pa de-ltar-ses-pa. 3
12. The Bodhisattva's knowledge about the Buddha's
cognition of min.ds as net liable to localization,
since they possess no separate essence of their
own, nor is there any similarity by which they might be
characterized. From the standpoint cf Ultimate Reality
the mind (of a living being) is devoid of an essence
relating to the present and is thus essentially unreal.
At the sarnie time it has no connection with the past
and the future in the sense cf being an effect and a
cause respectively. From this point of view it is therefore
likewise destitute of the character of a real object.
For this reason it cannot be the object of the three kinds
of vision, the ordinary *'eye of flesh" etc. 4 or of all the
1 Pane. III. 58b. 5-6.~^-sems yans zes-bya-bar yan-dag~pa-ji4taba-bzin-du
rab-tu-mkhyen-to. — Ast 263. 22—264. 2—
2 ==pravrtti~t)isaya-asraya.
3 Pane. III. 58a. 3-4.—sems tshad-med ces-bya-bar yan~dag-pa
}i-lta~ba-bzin-dtx rab-tu-mkhy en-to. - Ast. 264. 7-9.~-
4 The other two being **the vision peculiar to the gods" which
is the result of previous virtuous deeds and "the vision of Analytic
Wisdom" (vaipakika-divya-caksuh and prajna-caksuh). The "eye of
flesh" has for its objects the separate, differentiated thing (pratiniyatavastu),
the "vision of the gods" perceives or has the power of premoni-