Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the political economy of islamic discourse 87the statist-political culture and the interests of the Republican elite. The statepursued industrialization and capital formation with the aim of creating not anational bourgeoisie per se, as many historians have alleged, but one that wouldbe loyal to and indeed part of the new Republican elite. 21 The Turkish bourgeoisie,unlike that of Europe, was a product of state-led economic policies and mostof the time supported high customs tariVs to protect itself against foreign competition.This state bourgeoisie failed to develop its own cultural code and organicties with the larger society and culture. It functioned as the agent of thestate and tried to imitate European cultural practices without seeking any synthesiswith local tradition. It thus eVectively has functioned as a pampered wardand an agent of the state establishment.The State Economic Enterprises (SEE) became a source of “rapid employmentexpansion, motivated by the political concerns of generating support forthe government in power.” 22 The Republic thus successfully created its ownbourgeoisie, but because of its dependence on the state, this new class couldnot emerge as an independent force in politics and society. The liberal economicpolicies of Adnan Menderes’s government in the 1950s broke from this earlyRepublican tradition and promoted the interests of commercial farmers and theindustrial bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, however, continued to be state dependent.Turkey made good use of import-substitution strategies in the 1960s andthus “enjoyed a vigorous economic recovery together with high growth rates inGNP . . . 6.4 percent (1963–1967), 6.7 percent (1968–1972), and 7.2 percent(1973–1977).” 23 The 1973 oil crisis and the division of political parties and stateinstitutions along rigid ideological lines led to the fragmentation of the state andthe breakdown of the economy in 1977. The government was forced to implementharsh IMF structural adjustment programs. The government devalued theTurkish lira twice—by 23 percent in March 1978 and 44 percent in June 1979.These measures did not help because Turkey needed an even more ruthlessstructural adjustment policy that the weak government was not willing or ableto implement. The inXation rate rose to 120 percent, and unemployment was15 percent in 1980. Per capita GDP fell by more than 2.6 percent a year in 1979and 1980, while manufacturing output declined by 5.2 percent in the sameperiod. 24This economic crisis greatly contributed to the social unrest that impelledthe Turkish military to intervene in 1980. The military coup created the authoritarianpolitical climate that was needed for implementation of the structuraladjustment program, which moved from import-substitution to a growth-ledexport strategy. 25 This strategy reduced state intervention, alleviated paymentdiYculties, liberalized domestic pricing, and rationalized the public sector. Thecoup also made other adjustments possible: prices were freed, agricultural andother state subsidies were removed, and trade unions were banned. Özal, whobecame prime minister in 1983, closely cooperated with the IMF and the WorldBank in assuring that these reforms were implemented fully. Turkey receivednine structural adjustment loans during the 1980s. 26 In the short term, the structuraladjustment program yielded positive results. Turkey reduced inXation from104 percent to 28 percent in 1982, and achieved its Wrst positive growth rates as