Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

214 islamic political identity in turkeyAfter the 1983 election, the political elite decided that Islamists had to beintegrated into the system in order to pursue the goals of economic developmentand eliminate the threat posed by the Left. It was decided that this integrationcould be done only by accepting a “soft Islam,” that is, an Islam that thestate carefully domesticated and monitored. Subsequently, Islamist groupsentered the system through the expansion of educational opportunities, economicactivity, and party politics. The educational means by which this “domesticated”Islam was to help promote national unity included the opening of more8mam Hatip Schools and the introduction of Qur’anic classes. The governmentalso granted permission for Islamic groups to build private colleges and highschools and to establish new foundations and associations for carrying out theirsocial activities. 28 The economic sphere was penetrated by new companies ownedby Islamist entrepreneurs and by the establishment of an interest-free Islamicbanking system. Meanwhile, conservative groups found the new tolerance ofIslamic idioms in Turkish political and social life ideal for the promotion of theRP. As the isolated periphery began to take part in the system and to shape theeducational, political, and economic spheres with their own interests and values,the state became legitimized in their eyes in a way it never had been sincethe establishment of the Kemalist Republic. However, the “Turkish-Islamicsynthesis,” based on Sunni Ottoman traditions, led to a reactive politicizationof left-leaning Kurdish and Alevi identities. 29 In the interaction between the newlylegitimized Islamic groups and the Republican state, the process of interpenetrationmarked both sides. The Islamic groups were transformed from beingpurely marginalized social groups into sophisticated and complex organizationsthat were an amalgamation of state- and society-centered movements and interests.However, the relationship between Islamists and the state is dynamicand evolving. Therefore, the sociocultural and political processes by which Islamizationis actualized can only be understood by examining the dynamicsof the “top down” and “bottom up” processes. 30The RP, 1983–1998The municipal elections of March 27, 1994, and national elections of December24, 1995, marked a psychological break in Turkish history that was an outcomeof the search for new state-society relations and the rearticulation of national identity.Some newspapers reported the news under such headlines as “The OtherTurkey Wins the Election,” “The Black Turks versus the White Turks,” 31 or “FatihWon against Harbiye.” 32 Both elections ended with the victory of the pro-IslamicRP. The results of the elections revealed a society sharply divided along secularversus Islamist sociocultural lines. In this context, the RP is one of the main avenuesfor political Islam to articulate its demands within the public sphere. Itrepresents a platform for those who seek to change the secular system as well asfor those who demand reforms in the system, that is, within the bureaucratic statestructure. This competing, even conXicting, campaign to reorganize the politicalcenter and transform the bureaucratic system has mobilized large segments of