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Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

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the political economy of islamic discourse 95Reconstruction of the Prophet’s Merchant EthicsThe MÜS8AD represents the complex <strong>in</strong>tersection of religion and economicsamong the new Anatolian bourgeoisie. This process could only have been consolidatedwith the help of Özal’s economic liberalization. This policy alsopromoted the construction of an <strong>Islamic</strong> “Protestant ethic” by stress<strong>in</strong>g puritanical,this-worldly values that seemed to anticipate rewards for a virtuous life<strong>in</strong> the hereafter as well. This new bourgeoisie, organized around either Nurcuor Nak7ibendi groups, criticized “superstitious” beliefs, stressed a surpris<strong>in</strong>glyrational understand<strong>in</strong>g of faith, and deWned Islam (<strong>in</strong> MÜS8AD publications)as the religion of progress.The dynamic <strong>in</strong>teraction between contemporary <strong>Islamic</strong> movements andmarket forces, however, <strong>in</strong>dicates that Turkish modernization is not necessarilya carbon copy of Westernization. Whereas <strong>in</strong> the West, the embourgeoisementof religion led to the process of disenchantment, the Turkish case <strong>in</strong>dicates thatdisenchantment and reenchantment can coexist. 47 For example, <strong>in</strong> the case ofthe MÜS8AD, religion has become <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed with the market economy. Thisphenomenon illustrates the diVerent form modernity is tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Turkey</strong>. Civilsociety–based modernization from below, unlike the state-led modernizationfrom above, has created a hybrid that comb<strong>in</strong>es local practices and networkswith global and universal discourses of human rights. The utilization of religiouspractices and idioms to justify the market economy has become the majorsource for the <strong>in</strong>ner secularization of Islam.The ma<strong>in</strong> obstacle to the <strong>in</strong>ner secularization of Islam, however, is state controlover Islam. The existence of a “market” of religious ideas is a requirement forachiev<strong>in</strong>g a pluralistic democracy. Muslim merchants <strong>in</strong> the MÜS8AD competeto oVer an economic basis for the sustenance of a moral community. They tendto see Islam as a pool of ideas and strategies that can be employed to justify socialacts <strong>in</strong> the market environment. Thus religious enthusiasm, along with earn<strong>in</strong>gproWts, are the ma<strong>in</strong> motivat<strong>in</strong>g forces beh<strong>in</strong>d the expand<strong>in</strong>g Turkish market. TheNak7ibendi and Nurcu communities emphasize the merchant ethics of theProphet Muhammad and try to fuse these with the values of modern capitalism.For example, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, a lead<strong>in</strong>g Nak7ibendi leader, argues that thesearch for proWt <strong>in</strong> the service of the Muslim umma is on an equal level, <strong>in</strong> termsof religious practice, with pray<strong>in</strong>g and fast<strong>in</strong>g. 48 The <strong>Islamic</strong> identity of the newbourgeoisie, which is rooted <strong>in</strong> the market and shaped by <strong>Islamic</strong> ethics, not onlydiVerentiates MÜS8AD members from the members of the TÜS8AD but alsoprovides a powerful l<strong>in</strong>k between them and the members of larger segments ofsociety who are their consumers.<strong>Turkey</strong> had attempted to create a perceptible balance between state, community,and market forces through “Çankaya corporatism” (a state-guided attemptat corporatist control of society, named after the Çankaya district ofAnkara, where the presidential palace is located), but this eVort was very muchweakened by the 1980 military coup. The Özal government, <strong>in</strong> contrast withthe leaders of the military coup, recognized that private associations did not rep-

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