Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

200 islamic political identity in turkeyAlthough Gülen’s thinking is more strongly shaped by the Ottoman traditionof statehood than any speciWc Islamic precepts, he strongly supports democracy.He argues:Democracy and Islam are compatible. Ninety-Wve percent of Islamicrules deal with private life and the family. Only 5 percent deal withmatters of the state and this could be arranged only within the contextof democracy. If some people are thinking something else, such as anIslamic state, this country’s history and social conditions do not allowit.... Democratization is an irreversible process in Turkey. 70He similarly views democracy as a key means for promoting the Islamic dimensionof national identity. He argues that “we need to Wnd great brains and powerfulindividuals who would protect religion in the political domain.” 71Gülen’s main foreign policy objective is to create a powerful Turkey by organizingMuslim communities in the Balkans and the Turkic states in CentralAsia. 72 He sees the Kurdish and Alevi upheavals as external plots aimed at preventing“the emergence of a major power from the Adriatic Sea to the Walls ofChina.” 73 He sharply criticizes the state for not having a long-term strategy forintegration with Central Asia and calls on the state to support private foundationsin establishing schools and clinics in this arena.Gülen particularly believes that he can shape the political and societal featuresof Turkey through his organizational abilities in education and the media.He now openly argues that the movement has moved from the period of internalizationto that of the externalization of its ideas and vision. This new phase in themovement’s history has been compared to the “birth of a child.” 74 However, rivalIslamic groups have sharply criticized Gülen’s optimistic vision of Turkey’s futureand his leading role in it. His critics feel that his ideas are devoid of substanceand authenticity and that his organization lacks an independent power base toplay a signiWcant role in the transformation of Turkey. Gülen’s deft move towardsupporting a liberal economy and politics compelled him to internalize the modernpolitical discourse of human rights and nationalism. This in turn has limitedhis options and pulled him into controversy. For example, when Gülen was askedto comment on the confrontation between the military and the Erbakan-led government,he sided with the military, which was the ultimate locus of power, andsaid: “The government has failed to fulWll its functions and it should resign.” 75According to some Islamist critics, Gülen’s circle is not a religious communitybut rather an interest association. One young radical Islamist and criticin Konya said:The Nurcu circle constantly stresses the society and the individual.Fethullah Hoca and other Nurcus do not want the immediate controlof the state. Instead, they prefer to cooperate with the state to gainlegitimacy at the expense of other Islamist groups. They are tooignorant to understand that you cannot have an Islamic systemthrough the “bottom.” You need to control the state and then createit from the top down. 76