Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the neo-nur movement of fethullah gülen 203zation of Fethullah Gülen, which is formed to destroy the secular nature of thestate since 1989, wove the country with its legal and illegal networks that includesadvisory boards, regional, city, neighborhood, hostel leaders.” 85 As ofJanuary 2003, the prosecutor is seeking a maximum 10-year sentence based onTurkey’s Anti-Terror Law. The prosecutor does not mention a single act of“crime” committed by Gülen but rather refers only to his destructive ideas. Theindictment should be read within the political framework of the 1997 coup andits aim to criminalize alternative thinking. According to Çetin Özek, a leadinglegal scholar of secularism and criminal law in Turkey, the prosecutor’s case isagainst freedom of thought. The state, for Özek, “should not criminalize alternativethinking if it does not Wt into the state ideology.” 86 Gülen’s books, forÖzek, make the following conclusions:The theocratic system cannot be reconciled with Islam; science andscientiWc reasoning are necessary for the understanding of religion;jihad does not mean violence or bloodshed but rather training of thehuman spirit and inner self; the dissemination of religious ideas byforce is an anti-Islamic act; and a constant stress on brotherhood,tolerance, reconciliation and peace among humans. 87The anti-Gülen campaign forced Gülen to take refuge in the United States.This confrontation was one that Gülen always and judiciously had sought toavoid. Uncharacteristically, however, this attack was met with a sharp and hithertounprecedented counterattack by Gülen’s media outlets. 88 For his part, Gülenhad learned the painful lesson that obsequiously catering to the center of militarypower can breed contempt as much as it does forbearance. Many journalistsand members of Gülen’s inner circle believed a radical group within theTurkish army is behind this attempt to further curtail civilian authority. Theactivities of the Gülen community have been under close scrutiny and are perceivedas a source of fear for the secularist political elite for four reasons: Gülen’sattempt to redeWne nation, community, and identity in accordance with a religious-communalform of Turkish nationalism; his attempt to redeWne secularismalong the lines of Anglo-Saxon tradition rather than French Jacobinism; hisattempt to create a dense web of networks to gain international legitimacy andtranslate this into suppport on the Turkish domestic scene; and fourth, his attemptto challenge the Kemalist monopoly on education and modernity. Hisbetter equipped and organized schools have become a source of the educationof a new elite with multiple epistemologies, both secular and religious. Meanwhile,the Kemalist elite has feared losing control over education. The radicalclique within the army has always worried that Gülen could use his networks topenetrate state institutions and co-opt some secular intellectuals.State oYcials who are suspicious of Gülen’s long-term goals refer to histactics of “moving back and forth” in response to pressures from the state asbetraying his long-term agenda, which is not consonant with that of the country’smilitary-bureaucratic establishment. Even his statements apologizing for themilitary’s draconian edict forcing observant Muslim women not to wear headscarvesin public institutions and his liberal and paciWstic understanding of Islam