Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

246 islamic political identity in turkeyKurdish ethnonationalism and the proper attitude they should have towardthem.The regular military interventions and brieWngs against Erbakan’s pro-Islamic coalition government destabilized Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy.For example, on April 29, 1997, General Kenan Deniz, the head of InternalSecurity and the Planning Department at the chief of staV’s oYce, briefed journalistson the major security threats to Turkey: “Islamic fanaticism, the KurdishQuestion, and Turko-Greek relations.” Deniz identiWed Islamic radicalism asthe number one threat to “national security,” informing the journalists that“according to a new national security doctrine, the perception of threat hadshifted from outside to inside.” 24 The military’s main target was the Muslimsector of civil society, and the goal was to cleanse Islamic voices from the publicsphere by criminalizing Islamic associations, media, parties, companies, andpoliticians in the name of national security. 25 By stressing Republican authoritarianismover democracy, security over freedom, a rigid, fundamentalist secularismover tolerance toward religion, and state-led modernism over bottom-upsocial modernity, the military expanded its control in education, telecommunication,the legal system, business, and politics. This situation in turn resultedin the shrinking of political, economic, and cultural opportunity spaces.During the coup, the military worked very closely with major media cartelssuch as the Do:an group, which publishes the dailies Hürriyet and Milliyet,and leading business and university administrators in justifying the need formilitary intervention and civilian purges because of alleged “national securitythreats.” For instance, the Higher Educational Board (YÖK), an oYcial bodythat oversees postsecondary education in Turkey, issued a new set of regulationsto protect and preserve the Kemalist doctrine in higher education institutionsby seeking to eliminate all forms of Islamic identity claims. 26 The newregulations empowered university administrations to Wre those who “actedagainst the Republic and its values” and to strip professors and other facultyof their academic titles for expressing views contrary to the oYcial Republicanideology. 27 They also could “lose their social security rights and face a lifeban in state service.” 28This virtual declaration of “war” against a broad section of Islamic groupsextended to private business competitors of the state-supported oligopolistsconnected with the TÜS8AD. The army targeted 100 major Turkish companieswhose only apparent transgression was to be run by conservative Muslims,many of whom in fact had supported political parties other than the RP.The army included the prominent Ülker biscuit company, the 8hlas corporation,and the 36-company Kombassan conglomerate. Without the need for evencursory evidence, the army declared 19 newspapers, 20 national television stations,51 radio stations, 110 magazines, and 1,200 student hostels as constitutingthe “reactionary sector.” In response to the military’s actions, 300,000pro-Islamic demonstrators rallied in Istanbul against the closure of 8mamHatip schools on May 11, 1997. The armed forces responded to the increasinglybold and popular demonstrations by declaring their “readiness to useforce against Islamic groups” on June 11, 1997. Erbakan, sensing a forceful