Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

islamic social movements 19ideas and values and considers Islamic political identity primarily an epiphenomenonof rapid social transformation.The second strand of contextualism stresses organizational and leadershipqualities as well as the characteristics of the masses in the study of Islamicmovements and assumes that, despite overt appearances, they all have diVerentcauses and demands. 22 Some scholars who study Islamic movements arguethat religion is dynamic because it provides a set of mobilizing symbols, a formalstructure to organize people, and a leadership network to deXect and ultimatelyto penetrate the state. Scholars who adopt this line of argument treat Islamas the cement that binds together blocs of historically opposed forces to challengeauthoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, this strand fails to explain why diversecompeting groups tend to coalesce around Islamic symbols and idioms.By focusing on institutions and leaders, this approach fails to explain how themodern cognitive framework provided by Islam is formed and how it guidesthe actions of individual believers. It also prevents general theorizing aboutnot only how various Islamic movements diVer but also what they may have incommon.The third group of contextualist writers emphasizes the dominant role thatis played by the twin processes of state-building and nation formation duringcolonial rule. 23 Scholars of Middle East politics inXuenced by this school ofthought tend to stress the particular pattern of state formation as the reason forthe lack of democracy and the rise of authoritarian social movements. Somescholars have tried to understand the Middle Eastern state as a republic basedon oppression rather than consent. Their studies view Islamic sociopoliticalmovements as fragmented reactions to the “oppressive state.” These studies donot examine the state in relation to its “socioeconomic and sociocultural context”24 but rather see the state itself as the cause of the lack of democracy andcivil society in the Middle East. For example, Simon Bromley argues that “therelative absence of democracy in the Middle East has little to do with the region’sIslamic culture and much to do with its particular patterns of state formation.” 25The “rentier state” model has become a leading conceptual tool to explain socialmovements in Arab countries. 26 According to this model, the state derivesincome largely from oil, remittances, tourism, and external Wnancial aid; andcitizens with little or no taxation do not demand political participation as longas social services and food are subsidized. This approach, however, is overlydeterministic because it links oil wealth with authoritarian governments andignores sociocultural and historical contexts. For example, while the rentier statemodel may help to explain political liberalization in Iran, Jordan, and Kuwait toa certain extent, it does not explain why people invoke an Islamic identity ratherthan national or class-based identities when the social welfare safety net of thegovernment no longer is deemed adequate.This approach also overlooks other features of state and society, such as theproblem of well-oV and upwardly mobile segments of society whose economicand social success translates not into complacency but rather into increasedpolitical frustration. Eric Davis criticizes the state-centric explanations of thesociopolitical movements in the region and argues that “causal change emanat-