Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the matrix of turkish islamic movements 149have been critical of state-run education and religious activities. They preferautonomous community-run religious education and criticize state religiouseducation as state-centric. For instance, the movement has been critical of anddistanced itself from the 8mam Hatip schools.The Süleymancì order has become one of the most powerful proselytizingmovements among Turkish workers in Germany. One result, to the consternationof Turkish state authorities, has been that many religious Turks inEurope have become hesitant to follow the instructions of the state-controlledD8B. They reject the Kemalist version of secular Islam and, ironically, stressthat secularism in the Western tradition means that the state has no right tointerfere in the spiritual life of its citizens. 68 The followers of Tunahan duringthe Özal period warmly supported the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis.” The movementdominated religious student hostels, and the Qur’anic courses openedat this time. In the past the Süleymancìs have sought to inXuence politicsthrough their support of the AP of Süleyman Demirel (1964–1980), the ANAPof Özal (1983–1993), and the RP of Erbakan (1994–1998). 69 In the 2002 elections,two grandsons of Tunahan, Ahmet Denizolgun of ANAP and MehmetDenizolgun of AKP, competed for a seat in Parliament. The election of MehmetDenizolgun created a major power struggle between the brothers over the leadershipof the Süleymancì community.ConclusionThe Nak7ibendi orders, along with their complex web of institutions and practices,successfully expanded their inXuence and created new social, cultural, andeconomic spaces that exist independent of state control. The SuW orders haveturned out to be the primary sources of the diverse interests and identities thathave developed in the Turkish-Islamic scene. The discourse is led by Wgures suchas Necip Fazìl Kìsakürek, Nurettin Topçu, and Sezai Karakoç. This formationof a new urban-Islamic intellectual discourse indicates that Islamic acculturationgoes hand in hand with accommodating diVerent views and practices withinconventional institutions. To a large extent, the long tradition of the Nak7ibendishas been transmitted to the new urban culture through these Islamist intellectuals.The fact of having arisen within a SuW tradition distinguishes TurkishIslamist intellectuals from Muslim intellectuals in other countries. The TurkishIslamists appreciate the role of history and tradition and argue that the understandingof Islam is conditional on a person’s own spiritual quest. For thisreason Turkish Islamic movements generally have tended to be liberal, open,and ready to reconcile diVerences within a democratic context, rejecting the slogansused by those who call for an “Islamic revolution” or an “Islamic state.”Empirical study of the Nak7ibendi orders is very important for understandingthat the SuWs’ ability to adapt to new sociopolitical conditions also elucidatestheir power to shape society. From the examination of the Nak7ibendi orders, itbecomes apparent that Islam (as cultural and social signiWer) should be understoodnot as a self-contained reality but rather as a historically evolving belief