Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

52 islamic political identity in turkeytional identity. In the twentieth century, therefore, Turkish nationalism hasvacillated between two poles with regard to the place of religion in Turkish nationalidentity and culture. The Wrst trend sought a closer synthesis between Islamand nationalism, arguing for a reinterpretation of Islam to cope with modernchallenges. The second trend sought to divorce religion from nationalism andcreate a secularist ethnolinguistic nationalism.Although Atatürk’s “civilizing” project utilized the educational system totransmit a new sense of identity and a new value system, this purpose was inconXict with the deeply internalized Islamic value system found within the familyand the traditional neighborhoods. In other words, the Kemalist system couldnot be totally successful in breaking down traditional patterns of the productionand transmission of knowledge. In the Turkish context, therefore, two diVerentcultural patterns existed side by side in competition with one another.Furthermore, in attempting to create a nation out of diverse ethnic groups whowere uniWed and also at times divided by their own conceptions of identity andthe past, Atatürk’s secular policies also—and ironically—breathed life into religiousinstitutions of the periphery. As the state moved to penetrate every aspectof social life to mold a nation, it helped to turn peripheral groupings, such asSuW orders and the Kurdish tribal groups, into centers of resistance and alternativesources of meaning. In short, the exclusion of citizens from political decisionsand the attempts to impose a new identity on them forced them to turnto home-based identities to reinforce personal, tribal, neighborhood (mahalle),and regional loyalties. The dynamism of Turkish society thus resided in theseareas that were outside the control of the state. The Kemalist reforms, contraryto the commonly held view, did not unify society but rather helped to politicizenascent identities such as Kurdish ethnicity and Sunni/Alevi Islam. As a resultof nation-building and militant secularization, society came to be divided alongthe now familiar cleavages of Turkish versus Kurdish and state versus society.In contrast, the caliphate, abolished in 1924, had represented an Islamicly sanctionedunion of multiethnic groups and had recognized ethnic diversity withoutassigning it any political role. In other words, the caliphate was the symbolof a multiethnic polity and authority; it symbolized the unity of Muslims as afaith-based community and allowed space for diverse loyalties and local autonomyfor the periphery.With the processes of de-Islamization and centralization of political power,peripheral groups expressed their opposition in terms of Islamic symbols. Whenan initial experiment in multiparty politics was tried in 1924, it lasted only sevenmonths (November–June 1925) because the state aborted this tentative openingin response to antiestablishment demonstrations. However, the stage alreadywas set for the outbreak of widespread (Kurdish) ethnoreligious rebellionsagainst the secular reforms of the state. 55 Although the impetus and demandsof Sheik Said’s revolt were largely religious, the organizing group, known as theAzadi, aimed to create an independent Kurdish state. However, tribal rivalry andreligious divisions prevented full Kurdish participation. Although the Turkisharmy captured Sheik Said (1865–1925) and hanged him in Diyarbak1r, his re-