Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the securitization of islam and the triumph of the akp 251The success of the MHP, in contrast, is much more signiWcant because itis a long-established party with branches throughout the country. Yet prior to1999, the MHP had not been able to attract more than a small fraction of thevote (see table 10.1). How was it possible for this inexperienced party to doubleits share of the vote to 18 percent of the electorate? Various explanations havebeen oVered for this phenomenon; 52 the most likely is that the MHP’s risingstatus is an outcome of the securitization of Kurdish and Islamic identity claimsthat further polarized the society. There are three discursive political parametersof the MHP: the state, the homeland, and the nation. 53 Since the state is necessaryto protect the homeland, the nation should be in the service of the state.This authoritarian political culture does not assign any value to human rightsand cannot facilitate a consolidation of democracy. Rather, it institutionalizespolitics as a way of identifying the “friends and enemies” of the state and nationand calls on its Idealists (ülkücü) to sacriWce. The party deWnes the object andparameters of politics by the security concerns of the Turkish state. The MHPalways sides with the state when there is any tension between state and society.Hence its parliamentarians are more likely to function as representatives of thestate rather than civil society. In this ideology, Turkish identity is closely tied tothe state and, in fact, cannot be separated from it. The state has become theengine of political change. It is recognized as a legitimate institution that controlsthe destiny of its citizens. Because of the MHP’s statism, the military regardsthe MHP as a reliable and safe mechanism for maintaining the status quo.The military’s grip on society tightened, particularly after its February 28directives undermined the rule of law and weakened political freedoms. Majorsocial, political, and economic problems have been reduced to security issues;and the Turkish military, the self-appointed guardians of the Kemalist ideology,is intent on employing exceptional measures to cope with them. The securitizationof the political landscape in Turkey, therefore, led to the politicization ofthe judicial system in dealing with the “existential threats” of competing identityclaims by the Kurds and Islamists. The nationalistic revival is in good parta response to the military pressure to ensure control over domestic and foreignpolicy. The rise of nationalistic politics, both Kurdish and Turkish, and thesecuritization of the political landscape are mutually reinforcing. The results ofthe 1999 national elections did not remove the shadow of the Turkish militarybut rather has it looming ever larger over the new coalition governments.The outcome of the April 1999 elections can be viewed as the institutionalizationof the politics of fear. The military, with the help of the major mediacartels, successfully “convinced” part of the public of internal threats. This feartranslated into the political landscape in the April 1999 general election, resultingin the erosion of the two major center-right parties, the weakening of theFP, and increased support for the two nationalist parties. By concentrating allforces on hammering the pro-Islamic FP, the powerful military prepared theground for the nationalistic takeover. In portraying the ethnic and religious identityclaims as major threats, the NSC institutionalized a new framework forinsecurity.