Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

140 islamic political identity in turkeyrebellion, have been presented in the oYcial historiography of the Republic asa clash between “the forces of darkness and those of the Enlightenment.” 38 Inthe Menemem incident of December 23, 1930, a group of local Nak7ibendis wereinvolved in disturbances that, according to revisionist Muslim historians, actuallywere orchestrated by the state authorities as a pretext to murder the mostprominent Nak7ibendi sheik, Mehmet Esad (1847–1931). 39Facing severe persecution from the Kemalist state, the SuW orders, whichdepended heavily on the SuW lodge structure, began to wither. The program ofpersecution, arrest, and execution of members of the Nak7ibendi communitywas pursued ruthlessly as authorities labeled them “a snake we have been unableto crush.” 40 In spite of these purges, the Nak7ibendi-Khalidi order was notaVected by the elimination of all lodges to as great an extent as were other SuWorders that relied more heavily on the Wgure of the sheik and his lodge. SheikKhalid’s particular interpretation of zikr and rabìta did not require any outward,institutionalized religious rituals. At the level of popular religion, many peoplereplaced outward manifestations of faith with inner expressions as spiritualitywas restructured within the conWnes of the neighborhood and the family. Moreover,Nak7ibendi orders adopted themselves to the new realities of the Republicby taking civil service jobs at the Directorate of Religious AVairs to “cover”their activities and utilize the state-owned mosques as new centers of SuW activism.Thus these orders took refuge in the mosques and “covered” themselvesas the “mosque community.” The mosque in Turkey thus may be seen as a“lodge” building, since the mosques were the only spaces where formal andinformal religious structures simultaneously coexisted. The Khalidi Nak7ibendiorder thus emerged as the SuW order best suited to provide a matrix for the revivalof organized Islamic sociopolitical movements in the thawing period ofthe 1950s. The order managed to survive in the Kemalist period because thestate secularism regarded individuals as positivist abstract entities, without muchconcern for the ethical and spiritual dimensions of human life. The Nak7ibendiorder thus was strengthened and its purpose reinvigorated as it was able to meetcertain vital, personal needs of many segments of the population who felt alienatedand underrepresented by oYcial Kemalist ideology and policies.The Nak7ibendi tradition became the intellectual and historical groundworkfor a new urban Islamic intellectual discourse. Since intellectual activity not licensedby the state took place in private groups and networks, the SuW orderswere well positioned to become spaces for free thought and reXection for thereligious segments of Turkish society. Religious intellectuals emerged in thisperiod, such as Abdülaziz Bekkine (1895–1952), the spiritual leader of theHareket movement of Nurettin Topçu, and Abdülhakim Arvasi (d. 1943), whoplayed a critical leadership role in the print-based Büyük Do;u (Greater Orient)intellectual circle. In Istanbul, Wve main Nak7ibendi branches emerged: theeconomically wealthiest and most inXuential one was the 8skenderpa7a, led byNureddin Co7an; the currently most powerful branch is the Erenköy Cemaati;the more conservative and neo-Nak7ibendi are the Süleymancìs; and two morerural and conservative orders are the 8smail A;a Cemaati, led by MahmutUstaosmano;lu, and the Menzil Cemaati of Adìyaman. 41