Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the national outlook movement and the rise of the refah party 225Although the RP diVerentiated itself from other nationalist parties by stressingIslamic identity, an in-depth analysis of its rhetoric and practices demonstratesthat it was an Istanbul-centered Islamic identity in which the Ottoman legacyplayed a formative role for the reimagination of the future orientation of Turkey.The RP leadership, for example, asserted that the Muslim countries could form abloc only under Turkish leadership. This argument was supported by the historicalrole of the Ottomans, as well as Turkey’s location and vibrant economy. In away, Islamic identity and solidarity, for the RP, became an instrument for promotingTurkish national interest and a bargaining card vis-à-vis European exclusion.This neo-Ottoman vision of forming an Islamic bloc under Turkishleadership is a common theme among the RP leadership, who, unlike the party’ssupporters, believed that other subidentities and interests could be negated withinan Islamic identity. This in turn would eliminate many sources of conXict inTurkish society. Thus, the RP leadership hoped to terminate intra-Muslim conXictsby negating other identities within an overarching Islamic one. Therefore, theyproposed Islamic identity as a cure for restless Kurdish ethnonationalism. 58Although the leadership of the party viewed it as a higher identity to supersedediverse local identities, in practice the RP functioned as a mediator betweenor space-in-between diVerent identities that also helped to negotiate politicaltradeoVs between competing loyalties. The RP, according to Erbakan, “has anetwork and associational abilities to bring 65 million Muslims of Turkey tocreate the ‘leader’ country among the Muslim countries.” 59 The politically shapedand strategically deployed Islamic identity thus became a mobilizing tool in thehands of the party leadership. Erbakan conceived of the RP as a base for asupraidentity within which other ethnic, religious, and regional identities wouldbe subsumed. He saw the party as an institution for building identity by negatingthe sources of diVerence. He demanded that newcomers accept the formand ideology of the party, which would act as a school to mold and shape itsnew pupils. When Erbakan called Muslims to “come” and “join the party,” heexpected party institutions to reconstitute them with new identities and interests.He claimed that “our party, unlike the other parties in the parliament, hasfaith at the core. Whoever joins us will be transformed in due time. I also believethat newcomers will create new frontiers for the expansion at the core ofthe faith.” 60 Erbakan’s main concern was the politics not of pluralism but ofauthenticity. He believed that there is an authentic Muslim identity and voicethat should govern day-to-day politics. Within the context of Erbakan’s authenticity,there seemed to be limited room for pluralism and tolerance.Generational, Ideological, Regional, and Gender Cleavages within the RPAccording to the RP leadership, there were three spheres of confrontation inTurkish society: ideological (left versus right and Islamist versus both Marxistand Kemalist); ethnic (Turk versus Kurd), and sectarian (Sunni versus Alevi).The liberal wing of the party sought to eliminate these three zones of conXictby opening public forums for the discussion of such diVerences in the hope that