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Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

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240 islamic political identity <strong>in</strong> turkeyFollow<strong>in</strong>g the 1995 national election, the ma<strong>in</strong> political goal was to excludethe RP, which had won a plurality of seats <strong>in</strong> Parliament, from government (table10.1). In response to the pressures from the military, media, and major bus<strong>in</strong>esscorporations, 2 the two center-right parties formed a new coalition governmenton March 3, 1996. Tansu Çiller of the DYP and Mesut Yìlmaz of the ANAPagreed on a rotat<strong>in</strong>g prime m<strong>in</strong>isterial position, despite the traditional rivalryover their similar agendas and supporters. This development persuaded someRP followers that the <strong>in</strong>stitutional means of change were closed to them. Thede facto closure of the system to the largest party <strong>in</strong> Parliament agitated a largesegment of the electorate, and RP deputies became excessively restive. 3Moreover, by exclud<strong>in</strong>g the RP <strong>in</strong> the name of secularism, the Kemalistestablishment—that is, the armed forces, big corporations that preferred stateprotectedmarkets, and some media sectors—alienated the most dynamic segmentof the population, further narrow<strong>in</strong>g its social base and unwitt<strong>in</strong>glyexpand<strong>in</strong>g the RP’s base. Instead of seek<strong>in</strong>g gradually to <strong>in</strong>tegrate (and thusco-opt) <strong>Islamic</strong> groups <strong>in</strong>to the system, the political elite opted to preventthis “historic compromise” between the center and the periphery. Moreover,the TÜS8AD and its media networks, such as the Do:an and Sabah publish<strong>in</strong>gconglomerates, constantly represented periphery and prov<strong>in</strong>cial bourgeoisieas “reactionary” so as to exclude them from the privatization process andgovernance. 4TABLE 10.1. Electoral results <strong>in</strong> national elections, 1987–20021987 1991 1995 1999 2002Parties % seats % seats % seats % seats % seatsCenter-rightDYP 19.1 59 27.0 178 19.2 135 12.0 85 9.55 —ANAP 39.3 292 24.0 115 19.7 132 13.2 86 5.12 —Center-leftDSP 8.5 0 10.4 7 14.6 76 22.1 136 1.21 —CHP — — — — 10.7 49 8.8 — 19.39 178SODEP 24.8 99 20.8 88 — —NationalistsMÇP/MHP — — — — 8.1 0 17.9 129 8.34 —HADEP — — — — 4.1 0 4.7 0 6.22 —Pro-<strong>Islamic</strong>R/F a SP 7.2 — 16.2 b 62 21.4 158 15.4 107 2.46 —AKP — — — — — — — 34.26 363aAfter the closure of the FP, two parties with roots <strong>in</strong> RP and FP have been formed. The AKP emerged as themost formidable force <strong>in</strong> the Parliament.bIn order to meet the required 10 percent threshold, an electoral pact among the RP, the MÇP, and a m<strong>in</strong>orthird party was formed. A s<strong>in</strong>gle list of candidates ran on the RP ticket.A dash <strong>in</strong>dicates non-participation <strong>in</strong> election or no seat taken <strong>in</strong> the election.Source: High Electoral Board of <strong>Turkey</strong> (Ankara, 2002).

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