Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

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the securitization of islam and the triumph of the akp 263These new Islamically shaped public spheres and actors cannot be reduced torepresenting antimodernist or antiglobalist reaction but rather are productsof these new social forces. A new, hybrid, national, Islamic, modern identityand roles are under construction.ConclusionThe 1997 coup reminded society that it is not the owner of the state but ratherthat, in the Kemalist view, the state is the real owner of society. The entire Turkishconstitutional system is based on protecting the state and imposing a speciWclifestyle on society. Demirel, then president, argued that the 1997 couporiginated in the “proclamation of the Republic” and added that this process“will continue.” 62 Indeed, exclusion and persecution in the name of creating asecular nation-state has been the source of Turkey’s numerous fault lines andconstant instability. The 1997 coup sought to cleanse the Islamic presence fromthe public spaces of economy, education, the media and politics. In its anti-leftistcampaign, the state had used Sunni Islam as a Turkish-Islamic synthesis afterthe 1980 coup, and in 1997 it used the Alevi community against Sunni politicalIslam. However, the 1997 coup brought forward a questioning of the army’srole more than the 1961 and 1980 coups. In particular, many conservativeMuslim Turks, who constituted the traditional backbone of the military andmilitarism, started to question the legitimacy of the army. These groups usedto think of the army as the “heart of the Prophet” (Peygamber Oca:ì). Their questioninghas been very positive in the long run in terms of challenging the guardianrole of the military, strengthening civil society, and emphasizing thesigniWcance of human rights. Islamic groups all supported Turkey’s entry intothe EU as a way of controlling the excesses of the Kemalist army. The majorimpact of the 1997 coup was the Islamic rediscovery of Europe as a space andan idea to protect human rights and the rule of law. In other words, many conservativeMuslims recognized that Europe was more liberal than a Turkish societyregulated by the rigid military doctrine.At the core of the contemporary crisis in Turkey lies the oYcial state ideology,Kemalism. Kemalism does not see social, cultural, and political diVerenceas an integral part of democracy but rather treats sociopolitical “diVerence” as asource of instability and a threat to national unity. The current ethnic (Kurdish)and religious (Sunni Islamic and Alevi) movements seek to redeWne themselvesas “Muslims,” “Kurds,” and “Alevis” through the means provided by globalization.These identity- and justice-seeking social movements are in direct conXictwith the Kemalist project.Turkey needs a new social contract. The realization that coexistence dependson shared rules and the recognition of diVerences helped to transform the Turkishcitizenry’s conception of Turkey from being the “home” of a speciWc group,particularly Sunni Turks, to being a “hotel” in which each group has its ownroom and they all have to create the shared rules of coexistence. Consequently,
264 islamic political identity in turkeya deep search has developed for a new social contract in Turkey, with the EUbeing viewed as the facilitator of this new social contract. The founding principlesof this contract should include secularism, the rule of law, and recognitionof the multicultural nature of Turkey. Both Kurds and Turks and bothsecularists and Islamic groups need to be involved in this search for a new socialcontract.
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Islamic Political Identityin Turkey
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RELIGION AND GLOBAL POLITICSSeries
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3Oxford New YorkAuckland Bangkok Bu
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viiiprefaceWith these questions in
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xprefaceThis book is the product of
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xivabbreviationsPKKRGRNKRPSPSODEPSH
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BULGARIABosporusBLACK SEA0 75 150 k
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4 islamic political identity in tur
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6 islamic political identity in tur
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introduction 9dition and policies i
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introduction 11Hareketi) of Erbakan
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introduction 13national integration
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1Islamic Social MovementsA comparis
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islamic social movements 17Lewis, T
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islamic social movements 19ideas an
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islamic social movements 21two diam
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islamic social movements 23to undem
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islamic social movements 25tute but
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islamic social movements 27man righ
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islamic social movements 29great
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islamic social movements 31developm
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islamic social movements 33nant in
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islamic social movements 35life. In
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2The EnduringOttoman LegacyIn order
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the enduring ottoman legacy 39(1839
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the enduring ottoman legacy 41for c
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the enduring ottoman legacy 43was c
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the enduring ottoman legacy 45colle
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the enduring ottoman legacy 47The l
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the enduring ottoman legacy 49ing E
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the enduring ottoman legacy 51memor
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the enduring ottoman legacy 53belli
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the enduring ottoman legacy 55The K
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the enduring ottoman legacy 57their
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3The Tempering of theKemalist Revol
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the tempering of the kemalist revol
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4The Political Economyof Islamic Di
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the political economy of islamic di
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5The Role of Literacyand the Media
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the role of literacy and the media
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6The Matrix of TurkishIslamic Movem
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the matrix of turkish islamic movem
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7Print-Based IslamicDiscourseThe Nu
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print-based islamic discourse 153in
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print-based islamic discourse 155th
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print-based islamic discourse 157Nu
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print-based islamic discourse 159ci
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print-based islamic discourse 161in
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print-based islamic discourse 163ne
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print-based islamic discourse 165ha
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print-based islamic discourse 167an
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print-based islamic discourse 169De
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print-based islamic discourse 171ex
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print-based islamic discourse 173wi
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print-based islamic discourse 175Ye
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print-based islamic discourse 177er
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8The Neo-Nur Movementof Fethullah G
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the neo-nur movement of fethullah g
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9The National OutlookMovement and t
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the national outlook movement and t
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the national outlook movement and t
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Page 254 and 255: 10The Securitization of Islamand th
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Page 280 and 281: 1ConclusionSince 1923, Kemalism has
Page 282 and 283: conclusion 267Islamic movements in
Page 284 and 285: conclusion 269emotionally attached
Page 286 and 287: conclusion 271culture has promoted
Page 288 and 289: conclusion 273cultural means. There
Page 290 and 291: AppendixThe 18 Directives of Februa
Page 292 and 293: 1Notesintroduction1. The 1997 milit
Page 294 and 295: notes to pages 16-18 279Democracy a
Page 296 and 297: notes to pages 23-34 28138. See Cra
Page 298 and 299: notes to pages 41-47 28316. 8lber O
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Page 302 and 303: notes to pages 62-67 287The Tijaniy
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Page 306 and 307: notes to pages 86-89 291marginalize
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Page 310 and 311: notes to pages 117-122 295(Istanbul
Page 312 and 313: notes to pages 128-135 29788. Ecevi
Page 314 and 315: notes to pages 138-142 29931. Algar
Page 316 and 317: notes to pages 152-155 301Cemaatine
Page 318 and 319: notes to pages 166-179 303Erzurum,
Page 320 and 321: notes to pages 188-195 30520. Can,
Page 322 and 323: notes to pages 199-204 307leftists
Page 324 and 325: notes to pages 210-218 30917. Mehme
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notes to pages 236-242 313109. Erba
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notes to pages 247-253 31535. Musta
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1Selected Bibliographyworks in engl
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selected bibliography 319Gilsenan,
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selected bibliography 321Wagstaff,
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selected bibliography 323Kapacalì,
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1IndexAbdülhamid II, 42-46, 152Ada
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index 327Kavakçì, Merve, 99, 249K
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