Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

198 islamic political identity in turkeyactivities and engagement with diVerent intellectual groups is not to reorientthe state in terms of Islamic precepts. Rather, the goal is to promote a state ideologythat does not contradict Islamic teachings and opens spaces for diVerentimaginations of Islam in the public sphere.The State’s Co-optation and ExclusionIn the 1980s, Gülen gained oYcial protection during the late Özal’s terms inoYce as prime minister and president. The center-right parties all backed Gülen,hoping to counterbalance the votes of Erbakan’s RP in the general elections in1991, 1995, and 1999. Gülen developed close ties with Özal and openly endorsedÖzal’s neoliberal policies. In an interview Gülen said:I had a close relationship with Turgut Özal when he was working onthe State Planning Organization. He regularly visited my house andwe had breakfast and dinner together on many occasions. He evenattended my mosque and listened to my sermons. We held manyconversations about social and political developments in Turkey. Justa week before the September 12 military takeover, he visited me andasked what I was thinking about the prevailing anarchy and chaos. Itold him that as far as the future of Muslims was concerned, “I ampositive.” He responded, “[The] political situation is getting worse.” 59The relations between Gülen and the state were based on a code of mutualinterests. The governments of Özal and Çiller, and even the secular-Kemalistbureaucracy, regarded Gülen as a pliable countervoice to the Islamic RP’s moreovertly political role and more doctrinaire interpretation of Islam. 60 Despite criticismof his involvement in politics, Gülen did not hesitate to develop close connectionswith politicians. Indeed, as he became aware of his importance as apotential Islamist rival to the RP, Gülen regularly used his meetings with leadingpoliticians to advance the interests of his community and its programs. 61For example, he apparently perceived his meeting with Çiller, after she becameprime minister, as being in this vein. 62His general popularity has grown as a result of his “progressive” interpretationof the Qur’an. For example, he argues that women can become judgesand that the headscarf is not an essential attribute of a Muslim woman. In responseto Gülen’s broadminded interpretations, Mehmet 6evket Eygi, a columnistfor the pro-Islamic Milli Gazete, argued that “the headscarf, like theboundaries of Turkey, is not open to disputation. It is the boundary set by Godand cannot be discussed.” 63 As a result of Gülen’s ties with governing circlesand his more tolerant Islamic attitude, some more puritanical RP supportersaccused him of being an American agent. Ali Bulaç, a prominent Islamist intellectual,expressed a common suspicion with the following three questions toGülen: “Where do you stand as far as Mustafa Kemal and his reforms are concerned?Will you try to stop RP from coming to power? And why do you investin Central Asia but not the Middle East?” 64