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Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

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266 islamic political identity <strong>in</strong> turkeypreoccupation with secularism as deWn<strong>in</strong>g “modernity” and Islam as deWn<strong>in</strong>g“backwardness.” But <strong>in</strong> <strong>Turkey</strong> the <strong>Islamic</strong> movements have been neitherantimodern nor backward. Rather they are identity and justice-seek<strong>in</strong>g movements.Such movements seek to reclaim the Muslim “self,” which is perceivedas be<strong>in</strong>g robbed of its authenticity and identity. <strong>Islamic</strong> groups use “new opportunityspaces” where they can develop and experience novel lifestyles and identities.For example, Turkish Muslims utilize the pr<strong>in</strong>ted page, television screens,and educational <strong>in</strong>stitutions to act <strong>in</strong> concert to rearticulate a new <strong>Islamic</strong> identity,ethics, and justice. These spaces signify diVerentiation, contestation, andmultiple articulations of “self” and oVer frames of reference. The growth of themodern media and the expansion of universal education, <strong>in</strong>stead of weaken<strong>in</strong>gthe role and <strong>in</strong>Xuence of Islam, have led to its redeWnition as a dynamic form ofpolitical and social consciousness.These identity-oriented <strong>Islamic</strong> movements of <strong>Turkey</strong> are <strong>in</strong>terconnectedwith the processes of political participation and economic liberalization. Indeed,the democratization process and <strong>Islamic</strong> movements have become so <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>edthat it is almost impossible to determ<strong>in</strong>e where one beg<strong>in</strong>s and the other ends.This study of Islam <strong>in</strong> <strong>Turkey</strong> contrasts sharply with traditional studies of <strong>Islamic</strong>movements—usually focused on topics such as the <strong>Islamic</strong> Salvation Front<strong>in</strong> Algeria and the Iranian revolution—that have concluded that <strong>Islamic</strong>allyframed political movements constitute an obstacle to political participation. Thiserroneous conclusion is based on a set of problematic assumptions that religiousideas and <strong>in</strong>stitutions are <strong>in</strong> conXict with reform and compromise. In thisstudy, I have argued that the obstacle to the peaceful transformation of manyMuslim societies is not religious movements but rather the lack of political andeconomic liberalization. <strong>Political</strong> and economic liberalization of the state andeconomy would prevent any hegemonic and totalistic views (<strong>Islamic</strong> or Kemalist)from dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g everyday life. Various <strong>Islamic</strong> sociopolitical movements are,of course, not only active <strong>in</strong> <strong>Turkey</strong> but also map and mark contemporary politics<strong>in</strong> many Muslim countries, from Bosnia to Malaysia and from Kazakhstanto Nigeria. Issues of social justice and demands for authenticity <strong>in</strong> terms ofcultural and political identity rema<strong>in</strong> the two major concepts around which thesemovements have evolved. This global phenomenon prompts scholars of comparativepolitics to ask: Do <strong>Islamic</strong> movements reveal someth<strong>in</strong>g about the commonconditions of Muslims and the role of religion <strong>in</strong> politics? By exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthe processes of “fram<strong>in</strong>g sociopolitical issues,” I have <strong>in</strong>dicated that Islam as arepertoire of images and actions helps Muslims to form their conception of agood society and identity. These movements shape them and <strong>in</strong> turn help toshape the social world they <strong>in</strong>habit. Thus <strong>Islamic</strong> movements become reactionaryor radical if the state they operate <strong>in</strong> is authoritarian and does not allow roomfor economic liberalization.The ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>Islamic</strong> social movements studied here shifted from their desireto resist and co-opt the state to more society-centric movements because of theopen<strong>in</strong>g of new opportunity spaces, chang<strong>in</strong>g state-society relations, and economicand cultural liberalization. These movements, therefore, are productive<strong>in</strong> that they are redeWn<strong>in</strong>g and reproduc<strong>in</strong>g new social webs of <strong>in</strong>teractions.

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