Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the neo-nur movement of fethullah gülen 195toric role as the national religion of the Turks. To raise a new generation withan international vision, the Gülen movement stresses the role of bilingual (Turkishand English, not Arabic) education in Turkey and abroad. 37 Gülen’s visionin the Balkans and Central Asia is akin to an Ottoman-imperial vision that seeksto integrate the Muslim populations of these regions into a coherent bloc.In order to realize this mission, Gülen stressed the importance of investmentin education and media to raise people’s social and national consciousness.He has sought to reconstruct a new Turkish-Islamic identity througheducation and treated Islam as the foundation for a Turkish cultural and nationalrenaissance. Gülen has argued that “ethnicity” does not determine aperson’s value before God. However, he has regularly stressed the positive rolethe Turks played in the defense of Islam and its positive interpretation. 38 Thereis a deep feeling among neo-Nurcus that contemporary Arab regimes and societiesare wicked and too inept to understand and revitalize Islam. Gülen openlydeclared that “Turkey is the only country in which one can live freely and thinkas a Muslim.” 39 Gülen rarely hesitates to express his views on Islam within hisnational and state-centered framework. He argues that the Turks have achievedthe highest understanding of Islam and that this was manifested in Turkish-Ottoman culture and its tolerant state tradition. He does not hesitate to describethis “SuW interpretation of Islam” as Türkiye Müslümanlì:ì (Islam of Turkey). 40This interpretation of Islam consists of the SuWsm of Anatolia and the pragmaticstate-centric political culture of the Ottoman Turks. 41 By arguing that thereare various understandings of Islam particular to each country and region, Gülenaptly serves the state’s project of attempting to nationalize Islam. He argues: “Inever thought my Turkish identity was isolated from my religious identity. Ialways thought it was side by side with my religion. I did not see them in contradiction.”42 In the same interview, Gülen argues that “the state and nation mustbe melded together.” 43 Gülen’s political thinking, inXuenced by the state-centricOttoman culture and Turkish-Islamic nationalism, became very clear in his statementson the Alevi question and the Kurdish problem. As a solution to theKurdish problem, he asked the state to employ “Muslim ulema to stress religiousbrotherhood between Turks and Kurds.” 44Gülen and Mehmet Kìrkìncì represent the degree of accommodation thathas been attained by neo-Nur leaders with the Republican principles of thestate. 45 They present Islam as a unifying bond to hold together diverse societalgroups. Gülen supports the maintenance of the D8B because he sees the advantagesin an institutional religious center closely tied to the state. 46 Religionbecomes a framework for the unity of the nation and a source of state legitimacy.Islam in this context is subordinated to the existence of the nation-stateand used as a repository for the construction of a well-ordered society. 47 Gülenand Kìrkìncì therefore consistently have supported the state’s policy of consolidatinga Turkish-Islamic synthesis. 48Like Nursi, Gülen argued that there were three obstacles in the way of aTurkish national renaissance: ignorance, poverty, and dissension. It is interestingto note, however, that in his articulation of these three national problems,Gülen did not cite Nursi but rather Franz Kafka. 49 He rearticulated and projected