Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

258 islamic political identity in turkeyservant of society rather than an arrogant “headmaster” that dictates orders. Thiscognitive shift of seeing the state as a servant of society and not a “headmaster”was started, in actual practice, during the Özal era.Who among so many Turkish citizens voted for the AKP, and why? In orderto understand what they voted “for,” it is necessary to clarify what they voted“against.” They voted against the “center-right” parties, the ANAP and the DYP,and the two nationalist parties (MHP and DSP). The AKP received votes fromformer supporters of the FP, the MHP, and the ANAP. Thus nationalist (Turkish),conservative (Muslim), and economically liberal voters voted for the AKP.The major Xow of votes, in contrast to the 1999 election, came from the followingparties: RP/FP (69 percent), MHP (29 percent), and ANAP (29 percent).Moreover, 29 percent of new voters also voted for the AKP. The center-rightparties had been based on the balance between the state and society. Since the1997 coup, however, this balance has been lost at the expense of civil society.By attacking the SuW orders and Islamic networks, the coup eroded the socialbases of the center-right parties. This in turn delegitimized the center-rightparties, and they became simply agents of an oppressive state. The voters soughtto recreate a new political center according to their social needs rather than theneeds of the state. They voted “for” the AKP because of political, economic, andsocial reasons. For many, the AKP represents another attempt to retrieve thepioneering legacy of Özal in expanding the public sphere and bringing a sharedcode of moral values into the public sphere and in his eVorts to close the chasmseparating the Turkish state from the majority of Turkish society. It could economicallyexpand opportunity spaces in order to create more jobs to restore thesocial peace and integrate Turkey into the EU.One also needs to appreciate Erdo;an’s identiWcation and constant appealto Özal’s policies as a way for society to reactivate Özal’s legacy and utilize it topromote his new policies. Erdo;an was the only leader who identiWed himselfwith the spirit of Menderes in the 1950s and Özal of the 1980s. Invoking Özal’slegacy had a powerful resonance, since Özal had been successful in creating anindex of modern lifestyles in which Islam was the lexicon from which codingand legitimization took place. Thus there was a model of public policy demonstratingthe compatibility of worldly success and spiritual values by redeWningIslamic identity. Many Sunni-Muslim Turks who voted for the AKP voted forthe restoration of the Özal era (see chapter 4). In this way, the election was verymuch an act of restoration rather than a “political earthquake.” Erdo;an’s Özallikereformist message resonated with certain segments of the population whobelieve in the expansion of opportunity spaces.Özal initiated economic, social, and political liberalization, focused on theboundary separating the state and civil society, and used opportunities to empowercivil society vis-à-vis the state. Özal carried out a peaceful revolution of openingopportunity spaces for the excluded (dì7lanmì7) sectors of Turkey’s population.Since his untimely death in 1993, the process of liberalization not only has beeninterrupted but also was reversed by the February 1997 process. Moreover, the“dual-track government” expanded its power at the expense of the elected govern-