Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

96 islamic political identity in turkeyresent an obstacle to the state but rather an opportunity to expand legitimacyand to create dynamism within society. This dynamism came as a result of theexpansion of Turkey’s domestic and external markets. This process resulted in“Mecidiyeköy pluralism” (named for a business district of Istanbul where majorcorporations are located, including the headquarters of the MÜS8AD) replacingÇankaya corporatism. Mecidiyeköy pluralism genuinely promoted associationallife and tenuously integrated the Islamic movements into the economy throughthe Wlters of the expanding market.In addition to the MÜS8AD, several other associations and many charitablefoundations were established. These charitable associations usually have a religious-socialdimension that plays a key role by oVering educational services, runningprinting houses, operating television and radio stations, and staYng healthclinics. Thus a vibrant market freed from dependence on state subsidies and theseassociations have jointly carved out a larger space for voluntary activism and theexternalization of Islamic identity. With independent access to market resources,these associations have gained greater autonomy. This economic independencehas led to cultural independence, which has allowed these groups to oVer diverseand original interpretations of Islam to the public.The emergence of an independent Islamic bourgeoisie has threatened theKemalist establishment. Since the 1980s, there has been an enormous accumulationof capital in major Anatolian towns. 49 This capital is invested in both localand world markets. 50 In contrast, the “Istanbul bourgeoisie” of the TÜS8AD hasbeen reluctant to enter into open trade with the EU. Since 1995, TÜS8AD has beenlobbying the state to introduce new customs policies to protect its members fromthe competitive global market and, most important, from the MÜS8AD entrepreneursof Anatolia. The increasing tensions between the Istanbul and Anatolianbourgeoisie were a major factor in the political problems of the coalition governmentled by Erbakan’s RP. For example, when Erbakan tried unsuccessfully toundermine the dominance of the Istanbul bourgeoisie by removing protectionism,certain tax exemptions, and incentives that had overall negative eVects onthe economy, the media controlled by the “Istanbul bourgeoisie” enthusiasticallyencouraged the military to overthrow his elected government. The TÜS8AD remainedsilent when the military issued a list of over one hundred “Islamic” corporations,including some of Turkey’s leading exporters, that were to be put undersurveillance and denied access to state sector contracts. 51 The Istanbul bourgeoisiesimilarly did not protest when the Constitutional Court shut down the RP orsubsequently when the prosecutor demanded the closure of the MÜS8AD (April1998), accusing its president of “inciting hatred” in his speeches. 52Entrepreneurship and ProtoindividualityThe political culture of the 1980s was characterized by two contradictory processes:the struggle for recognition and the search for a new consensus. Thesetwo processes forced social groups to develop a shared code of conduct throughpolitical means. In other words, the separation of the economic domain from