Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the tempering of the kemalist revolution 73In their eVorts to engineer a new form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamicculture, the coup leaders published the National Culture Report. 50 Prepared withthe help of the Intellectuals’ Hearth Association, the report based its Turkish-Islamic synthesis on the pillars of family, the mosque, and the military, 51 threeinstitutional pillars that were to produce a disciplined and uniWed society. 52 Thehistoric Islamic umma (community of believers) seems to have set the modelfor a new sense of community that hypothetically could consolidate social unityand solidarity and thereby eliminate the conXicts of opposing ideologies. 53 IneVect, the 1980 coup leaders emphasized for the Wrst time at the oYcial levelthe religious component of the nation and state as being important and worthyof respect. In order to solve this legitimacy problem, state oYcials did not hesitateto adapt the model of the umma in their new articulation of state ideology.The coup leaders, in fact, pursued pro-Islamic domestic and international policies.For example, the coup leaders allowed Mehmet Zahid Kotku, a Nak7ibendisheik, to be buried in the garden of the Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul andshied away from closing the religious seminaries and dormitories of theSüleymanc1 order. 54Even though the military coup leaders conceded space for Islam in the deWnitionof state ideology and national identity, they still stressed the central roleof the state in Turkish politics. This is apparent in the 1982 constitution, whichmakes the nonelected NSC the ultimate source of authority. According to thedescription of the NSC’s duties in article 118 of the 1982 constitution,the NSC shall submit to the Cabinet its views on taking decisionsand ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation,establishment and implementation of the national security policy ofthe state. The cabinet shall give priority consideration to the decisionsof the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessaryfor the preservation of the existence and independence of the state,the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace andsecurity of society.The NSC law further sets out the basic duties of the NSC as (1) formulating thenecessary measures that will preserve the constitutional order, guarantee nationalunity and integrity, and guide the Turkish nation toward national targetsin accordance with Kemalist principles and reforms by uniting the nation aroundnational ideals and values, and (2) formulating oYcially prescribed NSC viewsto be held and followed by the government in times of emergency rule, martiallaw, mobilization, or war. Under the 1982 constitution, the military has fullautonomy in determining its recruitment and promotion rules, its budget, andhow it deWnes and implements the national security policy. This military rolevaries from direct to covert guardianship by preserving political will and thecapacity to take direct political action. In the 1982 constitution and in postcouppractices, the Turkish military regards itself as the guardian of the state andidentiWes its interests as the interests of the state. The military conXates its ownautonomy with state autonomy. In other words, state autonomy, for the military,means the insulation of the military from social forces and the freedom to