Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

216 islamic political identity in turkeyadhered to the laic identity, peripheral groups were all the more encouraged toidentify with an oppositional Islamic identity. Moreover, Islamic SuW ordersplayed a key role in the development of business connections that facilitated theirpenetration of the economy. The struggle between secular and Islamic groups,therefore, has both deep historical roots and economic dimensions. Islam hascome to play a leading role in the economic and political transformation soughtby this segment of society. Islam is the identity of this new wave of the bourgeoisieand, by drawing on their strong sense of moral probity and their communalsolidarity, they managed to overcome problems in Wnance and bankingthrough an Islamic banking system. Özal reached out to the traditional groupsof the periphery and accepted them as partners in opening the Turkish economy.These groups, in turn, reinterpreted Islam and Islamic society in a manner compatiblewith their own ideological needs as members of the provincial bourgeoisieand upwardly mobile technocrats. In the hands of the Anatolian bourgeoisie,Islam became an instrumental ideology for legitimizing business connectionsand proWt-making. This economic expansion helped to create a new image ofreligious uprightness and worldly success. This in turn made a reexaminationof Islamic identity and values appealing for those who also aspired to succeedin the capitalist market while retaining a sense of Islamic piety. While all thiswas proceeding, ordinary people simply stressed the value of religion in protectingtheir dignity and justifying their demands for social equity in the rapidlychanging Turkish society of the 1980s.Another reason for the strong showing of political Islam at the polls in 1995was the development of “personal Islam.” This inner Islam, in a manner akinto the return to religion seen in many advanced industrial societies, Wlled a spiritualvoid in the lives of many relatively educated and well-to-do Turks who soughtsomething beyond the verities of Kemalist positivism. Because the oYcial post-1980 coup policy of the state sought to identify personal religious devotion as“normal” and a sign of good “citizenship,” the eVect was to remove the onusthat had long existed on the outward display of religion by those with access toeconomic and political power. This renewed respectability of religion in oYcialcircles, albeit circumscribed, led to a competition between the mainstream center-rightparties and the religious Right over the representation of “Allah’s bloc”in Parliament. This further politicized religion and moved Islam into the centerof political debate. For example, a week before the 1995 election, the DYPcontrolledMinistry of Education gave full status to 70 new religious high schoolsand opened 6,000 new positions for religious functionaries. The DYP alsonominated Tayyar Altìkulaç, the ex-head of the Directorate of Religious AVairs,as its candidate from Istanbul. The ANAP, not to be outdone, allied itself withthe conservative Sunni-Turkish nationalist party, the Great Unity Party (BBP:Büyük Birlik Partisi), 34 and Korkut Özal, the brother of Turgut Özal. 35 The center-rightparties competed against the RP over representation of the Islamic vote.Political participation and electoral competition promoted the politicization ofIslamic and other forms of identity. Power brokers invoked Islamic symbols tocarry out their campaigns, and the center-right parties competed with the religiousright in representing Islamic interests in parliament.