Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the enduring ottoman legacy 57their religious identity and not simply take it for granted as in the past. Thesuppression of the outward manifestations of Islam encouraged in many Turksa deeper inner contemplation of their faith.The metaphors of the household and the neighborhood, however, shouldnot be limited to their literal meanings but instead should be understood asinclusive. Indeed, residential quarters, whether a household, a quarter of a town,or a village, became a bounded cultural whole where the local mosque played animportant role. Historically, the Ottoman quarter, known as a mahalle, “consistedof a religious community grouped around its mosques (or church or synagogue)and headed by its religious chief.” 68 The quarter, as a religious-administrative unit,also ran its own educational and public facilities during the Ottoman Empire.During the Republican period, the mahalle maintained its autonomy as a placein which an established code of ethics must be preserved. Everyday life requireda set of norms and strategies to deal with new situations. In the Turkish quarter,there was a strong sense of communal identity and solidarity, but this hadbeen eroded as modernization led to the massive dislocation of populations andas economic development and urbanization shook the code of ethics in theneighborhood.The main institution in the construction of Islamic political identity in thisenvironment has been the textual and tekke-based Islamic groups of theNak7ibendi (see chapter 6) and the Nurcus (see chapter 7). Confronted withpolitical oppression and coercive control of their conduct, the Nurcu groups andthe SuWs encouraged the process of withdrawal and the creation of an inner worldof faith. Moreover, SuWsm was also a reaction to the legalist-formalism of statecentricIslam. SuWsm became, as a result, more powerful in those regions wherea strong state tradition existed. This is so because as the level of state penetrationincreases in relation to society, SuWsm, which relies on inner withdrawal,can generate and maintain greater faith in the face of coercion. 69In addition to the SuW orders, textually based communities that evolved fromthem, such as the Nurcus, also helped to internalize and externalize Islamic politicalidentity by redeWning the function of the state. Said Nursi called on believersto shield their inner self from the oppressive “reforms” of the Republic. MehmetK1rk1nc1, a prominent Nurcu leader of Erzurum, has referred to this process asan internal hijra or migration of Muslims. 70 He argues that “the sun of Islam setdown in 1925 and dawned in 1950 with the writings of Said, which enlighten thedarkness of Kemalism with its light [nur].” 71 When K1rk1nc1 was questioned concerninghis deWnition of hijra in 2000, he said: “I mean the believer’s mentalmovement away from unbelief. The Muslims moved to an inner world to examinethemselves and develop a better understanding and arguments to overcomethe forces of darkness, so that God’s existence was of apodictic certainty.” 72 It wasnot a withdrawal from sociopolitical life but a strategic retreat and renewal.The internal dynamics of Turkish Islamism were shaped during this periodof withdrawal, from 1925 to 1950. The intellectual origins of modern TurkishIslamic social movements matured in this period. The secularization policiesof the state did not succeed fully because they focused on the public sphere andwere not able to touch the grassroots level of informal societal networks.