Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the matrix of turkish islamic movements 143als and representatives. Co7an calls on his disciples to study foreign languages,use computers, establish connections with the outside world, and visit foreigncountries. Co7an views engaging in trade and commerce as a way of shapingsociety and the collective consciousness. He argues that one must take foreigntrade seriously because “one road to success is success in trade.” 53 In his laterwritings, trade and economic enterprises are emphasized more than politics.Indeed, some of his speeches and articles were very similar to the speeches ofpresidents of corporations informing shareholders about the economic conditionof a company. Worship of God, for a follower of Co7an, can be realized inthe marketplace. Co7an says:Trade is real and permanent in an individual’s life. Other activitiesare utopian, hypothetical, and imaginary; whereas trade is the mostrealistic. As far as I am concerned, those who do not have tradeexperience do not turn out to be good humans. The most pragmaticand realistic people are businessmen and merchants. If a businessmanis also a Muslim, he is the most in tune with his religiousstation in life. 54In other words, Qur’anic verses were turned into slogans as a project in economiccompetition. The market conditions of the 1980s led to the process ofrecreating a new, abstract, highly centralized and economically conscious Islam,which was embraced by the modem urban population.The 8skenderpa7a oVers both a case study of a society-oriented Islamicmovement and a model of horizontal Islamic identity building. SpeciWcally, Iargue that 8skenderpa7a’s engagement within socioeconomic segments of societythat are not overtly religious in nature—such as the mass media, education,business—while continuing nonetheless to emphasize the primaryreligious purpose of promoting individual piety constitutes an important modelfor Islam’s future and peaceful co-existence with Western culture. In relatingto the modern Turkish state and politics, the order emphasizes a gradualist,accommodationist program and concentrates its eVorts on civil society. In theexpanding private economy, the Nak7ibendi order of 8skenderpa7a has changedfrom a state-oriented Islamic movement to a society-oriented one.The case of 8skenderpa7a illustrates that Islamic social movements are notalways a reaction to social change or massive deprivation, an eVort by the poorto undermine modernism, but rather can be an attempt to capitalize on newopportunity spaces, an eVort by the middle class to beneWt from modernism;by opening private high schools, hospitals, radio stations, local television stations,commercial companies, printing houses, and summer camps and forminga reliable network among Nak7ibendi businessmen, the order satisWes manyneeds of its followers. It also provides jobs in its own companies. Modem Islamicsocial movements in Turkey, therefore, respond to local as well as globalaspects of social change. Strategies chosen depend on the political context. Forexample, there is a close link between the degree of autonomy permitted by thestate and the cohesiveness of the order. If the political context is oppressive, tiesbetween followers are intensiWed and solidarity produces consensus. When a