Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the national outlook movement and the rise of the refah party 227course, are inclined to such liberal views, and a consensus or clearly articulateddoctrine on these issues is lacking.Erbakan’s speech at the RP’s Fourth Congress in 1993 carefully avoidedequating Islam as a religion with the party. In fact, Erbakan tried to reach out toeveryone, including nonpracticing Muslims. 63 He presented three solutions tothree immediate problems of Turkish society: recognition of Kurdish identitywithin the concept of umma; establishment of the Just Order to address theproblem of poverty and inequality; and “multilegal communities,” that is, eachcommunity would be governed by its own laws and norms to create a civil society.64 The conception of legal pluralism was concerned more with the autonomyof separate communities rather than individual freedoms. This proposal negatedindividualism in order to consolidate the authority of community. Erbakan’sspeech, which set the tone for the 1994 municipal elections, played a key rolein the transformation of the RP’s image from that of a potentially rigid fundamentalistparty to one willing to compromise and work within the system. 65 Inhis speech, Erbakan diVerentiated majority democracy from pluralistic democracyand said that pluralism and diversity are a necessary framework for prosperityand a working democracy. 66 The speech demonstrated that Erbakan andthe party leadership realized that they would have to temper their rhetoric andmodify their views if they were to secure enough popular support to form agoverning coalition. In fact, a group of liberal intellectuals, including Zengin,Ali Bulaç, and Mehmet Metiner, had prepared Erbakan’s speech. 67Regional IdentitiesThe 1994 local and the 1995 national elections transformed the political landscape.Some secular groups interpreted this transformation as a revolt againstKemalism, whereas Islamist publicists viewed it as the gradual democratizationof the Republican political system. In fact, the election was a turning point interms of bringing peripheral and marginal voices to the center of Turkish politicaldiscourse. The new pragmatism of the party, its long-term strategy tobecome a legitimate part of the system, and its organizational skills were themain factors in this process.Erbakan, as the RP leader, was capable of orchestrating many of Turkey’sdiverse Islamic groups through his personality and leadership skills. His capablerighthand man, O:uzhan Asiltürk, aided him in this eVort. They made Turkey’svariegated Islam a source of strength that allowed the party to penetrate virtuallyevery corner of society. In its leadership characteristics, the RP was similarto other Turkish political parties: The leader’s personality dominated the institutionsover and above the party itself. One of the major reasons for the RP’spolitical success was its organizational Xexibility and strategic use of modernmeans to mobilize traditional networks. The organizational structure of the partywas known as the tesbih model (i.e., the provincial organizational committee has33 members, modeled after the 33 beads of the traditional Muslim rosary). Each