Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

the political economy of islamic discourse 89tablish economic and cultural ties with these countries that the Republicanelite long had tried to downplay. Those who were involved in trade relationswith oil-rich Muslim countries used some of their proWts to promote Islamicactivities—such as opening private schools or supporting publications of newjournals and books. Cultural interaction and the restoration of historic connections—ratherthan a deliberate program of Islamicization funded by GulfArabs—contributed to a signiWcant reconsideration of past ties with West Asianneighbors. This oil money was distributed to new Islamic groups through wellfundedWnancial circles. 34 In fact, one of the Wrst policy decrees of the Özalgovernment, on December 16, 1983, provided legal grounds for charitabledonations to be used for religious purposes in Turkey. Nurcu groups helpedto form the Faisal Finance Company in August 1984. Korkut Özal, the primeminister’s brother and a prominent Nak7ibendi follower, and Eymen Topba7,the brother of Nak7ibendi sheik Musa Topba7, founded Al-Baraka Türk. TheÖzal government introduced tax reform laws that exempted these Wnancialinstitutions, which operated according to Islamic principles forbidding interestpayments. 35In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Özal’s antibureaucratic and free marketpolicies were supported by small-scale provincial business owners and thepetite bourgeoisie of the large cities. This petite bourgeoisie consists of peddlers,dealers, small constructors, restaurant owners, small industrialists, textilefactory owners, and food processors. This sector does not want stateintervention in the economy; it is therefore the main supporter of economicliberalization. This sector Wnds in Islamic symbols and ethics useful weaponsfor fomenting public opinion against state regulation of the economy andagainst the big industrialists who enjoy state patronage. The Islamic voiceswithin this informal sector believe that society would prosper if the state wouldstop intervening on behalf of big business. Islamic associations (MÜS8AD andHÜRS8AD) also oVer small business owners a critical network where they canmeet to voice shared concerns and frustrations and also to engage in businesstransactions.In this period, as noted, a new class of bourgeoisie emerged that has beenclosely identiWed with Islamically inclined segments of the urban populace. However,the Islamic capitalists who beneWted from the liberal policies of the 1980srepresent only one privileged section of the broader Islamic movement in Turkey.In the long term, the structural adjustment policies of the Özal governmentdid not solve Turkey’s chronic inXation (which has continued to hover at over70 percent), high interest rates, or mounting external debt (which had reachedUS$70 billion by 2000). The program to privatize fully ineYcient public sectorindustries has not been realized because the ruling parties utilize state enterprisesas a source for allocating patronage to their supporters. During the 1990s,the earlier success of the structural adjustment program soured, and the beneWtsof economic liberalization failed to “trickle down” to the squatter towns, wherethe urban poor are beset by high inXation and bereft of welfare assistance. Thesquatter town environment has become a breeding ground for radical ethnicand religious ideologies. 36 It is thus clear that macroeconomic policies have