Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

220 islamic political identity in turkeyAnother major question asked by the ARAS survey had to do with the expectationsof RP supporters of the contingency that their party came to power.The supporters said that they were not expecting the party to institute the sharia;for only 15.5 percent said that it would implement an Islamic criminal code andlegal system if it came to power. Instead, nearly 73 percent of men and 61 percentof women held that the RP’s program had nothing to do with implementingsharia. These responses are a further indication that the support for the RPwas not based on purely religious sentiments, and a religious revival was not anadequate explanation for the political triumph of the party. The reason for itssuccess was its ability to articulate socioeconomic issues through the commonidiom of the masses. The party also enjoyed a reputation for opposing the dictatorialpolicies of the state and its supporters in the parties of the center whileit espoused a more politically liberal ideology.Although the RP built on the foundation of the MSP, its borders encompassednew socioeconomic solidarities. The RP’s success, therefore, cannot beexplained by the alleged rural and underclass nature of its electorate. The incorporationof new groups within the party became a reason for its success. Simplyto label the RP as Islamic does not further understanding of its societaldynamics. Moral questions and values in Turkish politics largely have been articulatedin Islamic terms because the Kemalist cultural revolution did not producean alternative shared moral language, and Islamic references and idiomsremained the depository for this moral debate. Instead, that which is Islamicand that which is secular is largely a contextual matter that determines, for example,whether the ANAP’s criticism of alcohol and gambling will be consideredby others as its “Islamization of social life.” In other words, moral questionsraised by the RP or any other political party always invoke the name of Islam.This area was not simply the domain of the RP. Furthermore, the ruling secularelite often has labeled popular antigovernment protests as “Islamic and reactionary”in order to delegitimize them. This tactic not only promoted thepoliticization of religion but also strengthened antirepublican sentimentsthroughout much of society. These political responses are a result of an erosionof public values and a sense of ethical crisis that Turkey has been experiencingfor some time. In eVect, the secular system has failed to produce a proper ethicalcode for the new level of social and economic development. Because thesystem and its political ideology did not seem capable of providing values forcivil society, many in Turkish society began searching for a new moral framework.To resolve this conundrum Turkey needs to transform its concepts of thestate, society, and individual.The Political Appeal of the RP: Justice and IdentityThe most critical factors in the strength of the RP are to be found in its discourseson identity and justice. Devout Muslims evoked Islamic symbols and institutionsto express their discontent and, most important, to construct their ownvision of modernity by reactivating Islamic tradition. The Turkish paradox is