Islamic Political Identity in Turkey

184 islamic political identity in turkeyand imbues his messages with feelings of love and pain. He targets people’shearts more than their reason, and this appeal to feelings helps him to mobilizeand transform Muslims. Gülen’s style is eVective and forms a powerful emotionalbond between him and his followers. He not only stirs up the emotionsof the faithful but also exhorts them to self-sacriWce and activism. Thus he armshis followers with an emotional map of action to translate their heart-guidedconclusions into action. His preaching style also is a way of transforming theself by carving an inner space to resist oppression and cultural alienation.This shift from religious-nationalist to more inclusive language createdbridges with secular liberals and atheists in Turkey. Gülen acquired a reputationas the moderate, emotional, and caring hocaefendi. Moreover, his inclusiveand liberal interpretation of Islam as a religion of love, peace, and socialresponsibility helped him to add new circles to the movement. These newcomersconstituted a sympathizer circle within and outside the movement. Becausethey had diVerent backgrounds and expectations, their presence forced themovement to liberalize its language and recruitment practices further. Themovement gradually shed its religious-ethnic communalism and anticommunistrhetoric. In short, Gülen’s neo-Nur movement evolved into a more moderateand open movement as it participated in the cultural, economic, and socialdomains, becoming a national-level civil movement inspired by Islamic ideasof social responsibility. The Gülen movements attempted to bring “religion” intothe production of public opinion on issues such as how we ought to live andhow we ought to think about how to live. This in turn led to the objectiWcationof a “religious worldview” as an autonomous category to frame social and politicalissues. The process of “going public” and trying to communicate withinthe normative domain of the public sphere in Turkey required the Gülen movementto moderate its voice and frame its arguments in terms of reason and interests.This slow yet profound attempt to “go public” has facilitated the internalsecularization of religion by forcing Nur groups to compete with diverseworldviews and frame their arguments so that anyone could understand.In the 1980s, the Islam advocated by Gülen emphasized tolerance and coexistencewith other cultures. He drew much of his support from engineers,the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, academics, and other professionals. In hisspeeches, he carefully stressed the role of merchants and businessmen as thesources revitalizing Turkey as a regional power. The three sociopolitical conditionsmade the Gülen community “come out” in public and venture to reconstructthe external world with Islamic consciousness. The conditions that ledto the “coming out” and eventual transformation of the movement were therelaxation of the state’s policies toward society, particularly its religious aspects;the existence of a new conscious and economically powerful bourgeoisie tosponsor Gülen’s projects, along with the new urban educated professionalsand teachers to take part in his schemes; and a democratic environment andassociational life to organize his activities. These conditions helped to unleashthe potential power of the movement just as the “chick was in the egg andwaiting to be hatched,” and political conditions helped the “chick to hit its shellto come out.” 12