[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

Sans le correctif du commandement d’amour, en effet, la règle d’or serait sans cessetirée dans le sens d’une maxime utilitaire dont la formule serait do ut des, je donnepour que tu donnes. La règle: donne parce qu’il t’a été donné, corrige le “afin que” dela maxime utilitaire et sauve la règle d’or d’une interprétation perverse toujourspossible. 13Likewise, here forgiveness works horizontally like a demand of reciprocity submitted torules and conditions. Sometime it works vertically as the unconditional that can appear butcannot be forced to appear, but is attempted -- thinking ourselves capable. It is thusnecessary to move constantly to assume the responsibility of the demands of forgiveness,to make oneself capable of it (which is submitted to conditions), while at the same timealso to accept oneself as incapable, impotent (it would be necessary for the forgivenessto be entirely selfless and one never knows if it is).As always, and a little like a Platonic dialogue, Ricoeur stages this disproportionthrough readings that he opposes and conjoins, by which he lets them somehow conspirebefore arranging them and bending them to his plan. It is in this way that he borrowssome elements of my analysis of the moral dilemmas of horizontal forgiveness, andborrows from Derrida some of the essential characteristics of the height of verticalforgiveness. And this is how he constructs his frame, which is like the limit idea of thewhole book. It is a Kantian idea, and it is as if he defended a Kantian concept usinghuman history.6. A Kantian FrameNow Derrida some time ago wrote a very beautiful text on the parerga, by which I wouldlike to make a detour. There he analyzed the notion of disinterested pleasure, defendingthe disinterestedness against Nietzsche and the pleasure against Heidegger; but he alsonoted Kant’s distrust of the parerga, this non-organic supplement to the work, as theframe for the pictures or the garments for the statues, this superfluous supplement. Thisframe, that is neither interior nor exterior, a little like the player who is neither inside hisgame nor outside his game if he is really playing, Derrida recovers it in the very structureof the Critique of Judgment, where Kant imports into the analytics of aesthetic judgmentthe set of judgments that issued from the Critique of pure Reason. The frame fits poorly:on transpose et fait entrer de force un cadre logique pour l’imposer d’une structure nonlogique, une structure qui ne concerne plus essentiellement un rapport de l’objetcomme objet de connaissance. Le jugement esthétique, Kant y insiste, n’est pas unjugement de connaissance. 14According to Derrida, the only justification of this transposition resides in a hypotheticallink with understanding. Making allusion to the Critique of Judgment (paragraph 1, p. 49),Derrida comments:1314Paul Ricoeur, Amour et justice (Paris: PUF, 1997), 56-58.Ibid., 81.104