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intentionally structured self-consciousness that itself remains always dependent upon andinseparable from the human subject’s first-person mode of self-presence. The humansubject’s self-conscious experience of alienation is possible only because humansubjectivity’s manifestation in the form of affectively structured self-awareness is alwaysand only a first-person experience that is impervious to the corrosive effects of theexistentiell experience of alienation that occurs within the third-person subjective mode ofintentionally structured self-manifestation, i.e., intentionally structured self-consciousness.The human subject is indeed truly able to be manifest to itself in the mode of alienatedself-consciousness, such that the self seems to exist as a self supremely in its experienceof being dissociated from itself; but such can be the case only on the foundation of thehuman subject’s first-person and affectively structured experience of being self-aware, ofbeing always already given to itself as itself in its first-person experience of the “immanentdialectic” of suffering and joy. A stone can never appear in a first-person form,and so a stone can never appear in an alienated third-person mode either, at least on itsown power. In and of itself, a stone can only appear in the form of an object within anontological horizon in which human subjectivity itself can never appear, no more in itsthird-person mode than in its first-person mode.Even when a human subject experiences itself in an affectively alienated third personmanner, therefore, its experience of itself as an alienated self is the lived experience ofa subject and never the ontically passive condition of an object. Furthermore, this subjectivethird-person mode of self-manifestation is not itself the human subject’s originalmanner of being manifest. I am specifically different from a stone because while a stonecan only appear to me, and this only in the mode of an object, I appear to myself, and Ido so originally in an excessive and first-person manner that excludes in principle all possibilityof my living an insurmountably alienated human existence in the third person. Itis on account of my constant lived experience of myself in the first person that I am anego, that I exercise a manner of being and appearing that remains phenomenologicallyheterogeneous to the manner of being and appearing proper to a stone. If therefore I amto be able to give a positive account of the real experience of human alienation, Henryargues, I can do so only from “within” the first-person mode of being and appearing thatI always already both live and am.Because human self-manifestation is a traumatic, first-person manner of appearing tooneself, the human “alienation” of which Henry seeks to give a positive account in PPB(and therefore also in EM) is contingent rather than necessary, surmountable rather thanontologically ultimate, precisely because this experience is intentionally rather thanaffectively structured. The human ego’s original, traumatic, and first-person manner of selfmanifestationto himself as himself, on the other hand, necessarily arrives in the form ofan “affective tonality,” a “mood,” a Stimmung. 45Henry illustrates what he means by an alienation that is primarily intentional ratherthan affective by recourse to the example of the lived experience of Maine de Biran,whose philosophy of the subjective body PPB sets out to articulate. Maine de Biran’stestimony concerning himself is paradigmatic of human self-experience in general as being“the experience of an affective life which is constantly changing, of a humor which is atone time gay, at other times sad, more often sad, and whose modifications seem to beindependent of the will of the ego which experiences them.” 4645Cf. Michel Henry, L’essence de la manifestation (Paris: PUF, 1963), 19, where Henry equates theultimate power or essence of manifestation with “la vraie Stimmung,” hereafter M.46PPB, 154.148
For Henry, however, Maine de Biran’s “consciousness of an enslaved affective life” 47is precisely a function of intentional consciousness, such that the experience of selfconsciousnessis a founded experience that arrives in the mode of the third person, andnot at all a function of the founding first-person experience of oneself as oneself given inthe affectively structured and irreducibly first-person mode of self-awareness. While wemight understand our existentiell suffering and sorrow as weakness and alienation, we canso understand this founded form of intentionally structured suffering only on the foundationof our ontological and affectively structured undergoing of ourselves in the form ofa trial that is identically a triumph. 48 This dolorous, originarily first-person experienceof self is thus for Henry something that is neither existentiell nor negative, but rathersomething wholly ontological and positive in nature. 49The whole of EM is dedicated to situating the meaning of the Being of the human egowithin the insurmountably subjective immanent dialectic, the “edificatory integration” 50of suffering and passivity that is always and also the ultimate condition of possibility ofhuman joy and human action. My originary experience of helplessness and sorrow turnsout in fact to be first and foremost an expression of the originary Ereignis, the ontologicaland excessive experience of myself that arises effectively prior to and independently ofany mediation on the part of any ontic or ontological reality deprived of ipseity. It is ipseityalone that for Henry can truly count as “life.”“La Vie,” Life, is originally and ultimately God himself. 51 In a move that is itselfcharacterized by excess and violence, Henry dares to claim that on philosophical groundsalone, authentically human beatitude can ultimately only be apprehended in terms ofhuman salvation, such that the issue of God is always ultimately what is at issue when itis a question of human life and human destiny. 52 God is the Truth and the Life in whichhuman life is essentially and by nature included, the absolute Life by which alone human47Ibid., 155.48Ibid., 154. As Audi observes, the problem of the meaning of the “enslaved affective life” is alsoof primary importance for Rousseau. Cf. REP, 244-45. Audi cites passages both in Emile and in theDialogues in which Rousseau comments on the “flux continuel” of our affections, the passage fromsuffering to joy and from joy to suffering which he himself experiences. Audi notes that the “autobiographical”writings of Rousseau in which Rousseau discusses his own powerlessness relative to hisaffective life are in fact both ontological and ethical in character. As ontological, they concern that whichwe truly are in our original mode of self-givenness. As ethical, they are concerned with the existentialquestions to which our ontological “situation” gives rise. Rousseau’s writings are concerned with myproperly human response to the existential situation in which I find myself always already having beensituated. This existential situation is in truth an ontological “position” that is the ground of my unique andirreducible ipseity, from which I cannot escape, but which requires rather that I “suffer myself” -- permitmyself -- to suffer that which I am. For Audi’s complete discussion of this theme, cf. REP, chapter four,“La position du Soi,” 179-253.49Cf. EM, 657.50Ibid., 661.51The whole of CMV/IAT is an effort to show that there is one sole Life, that of God, which is alsothe life of man.52Here one discerns the similarity of Henry’s project with the philosophical project of Hans Urs vonBalthasar. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Epilog (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1987), 18: “Die wahrhaftphilosophische Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins im Ganzen wird, auf den Menschen zugespitzt, zurreligiösen Frage nach seinem Heil im Ganzen.” There are many points of convergence between Henry andBalthasar relative to the centrality of the question of the meaning of human reality within their respectivephilosophical and theological projects. These points of convergence are uncanny both in their number andin their similarity of formulation, given that neither Henry nor Balthasar ever acknowledged or appearedto know of the work of the other.149
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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Page 106 and 107: Sans le correctif du commandement d
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Page 113: III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
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Page 118 and 119: If our analysis is correct, the “
Page 120 and 121: The esthesiology of the senses of t
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Page 132 and 133: out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
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Page 144 and 145: While Henry thus questions “the m
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Page 154 and 155: 4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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Page 166 and 167: Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
Page 168 and 169: The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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Page 172 and 173: According to views held by Gadamer
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Page 189: IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
Page 192 and 193: Therefore, I would like to concentr
Page 194 and 195: classical Greek tradition of thinki
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-
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