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or his social nature. For this reason, the problem of the philosophical project is displacedfrom the transcendental level of a priori knowledge (Erkennen) to the level of the conceptof Wesensschau, to use Edmund Husserl’s expression. At this point, however, we meetonce again the problem that we discussed above: as the sciences of experience couldalways dispute the a priori philosophical access to man, philosophy could always rejectits pleadings in favour of the a posteriori approach. 9 It is impossible to abolish thedichotomy between the a priori and the a posteriori, as we tend to bind the twoapproaches together in man, by inventing a unifying structure to deal with it. It would bebetter to leave open this dichotomy between the a priori and the a posteriori and to leta structural resolution be attained by itself within this openness.This would also mean that our subject-matter, the nature of man, would remain an openproblem. This point of view was put forward by one of the most notable representativesof twentieth century philosophical anthropology, Helmuth Plessner. He did not, however,manage to establish appropriate dynamics for such openness, which consequently remaineda determining factor concerning the problem raised by the a priori quality of anthropologicalstatements. 10Terms such as a priori and a posteriori, proteron and hysteron, do not only possessepistemological validity, but also and above all, a constitutive historical validity, as theirlinguistic origins already imply. The historical openness of the difference between an apriori and an a posteriori reaches deep into the interaction between man and philosophyitself. As such, it remains representative for the European type of human being, whichpretends at the same time to be a universal anthropological type (“sciences,” “democracy,”“culturalism”). This interaction showed up originally in the Delphian dictum, gnotiseauthon, know thyself, namely in relation to beings as a whole, to their testimony. 11The appendix to this dictum (in relation to its totality) is essential, since we wouldotherwise completely misconceive the genuine philosophical dimension of this imperative.This self-knowledge is neither meant to be introspective, nor to be contemplative. It forcesus to view the question of beings as a whole, i.e., the world, as an open question withregard to our own life. Thus, man becomes historically responsible vis-à-vis that question.Only in such a way can a theory of beings as such, and as a whole, embody simultaneouslythe highest experience and the highest fulfillment of human life. The dynamicsof this fulfillment can be thought out according to the model of the twofoldphenomenological openness, i.e., the apparentness of the world and the openness of manto this apparentness. This modifies substantially the epistemological scheme of the a prioriand the a posteriori. The event of this openness would represent the meditative midwaybetween the viewpoints of Unity and Diversity of the world. The world as a unitaryapparentness would always simultaneously represent a different openness to man. Betweenboth terms, “only” historicity has an effect, while an additional Unity would still not work.However, the event of this openness should be brought toward the notion of a hermeneuticcomplement of phenomenology.Representing the apparentness of the world and the openness of man, this double-sidedopenness stands for a renowned phenomenological theme. On that account, Husserl’sphenomenology formed itself as the correlative way of the contemplation of “that which9Cf. Ludwig Landgrebe Philosophische Anthropologie - eine empirische Wissenschaft?, in idem,Faktizität und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982),1-20.10Cf. Helmuth Plessner, Der Aussagewert einer philosophischen Anthropologie, in idem, GesammelteSchriften, vol. 8 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1981), 380-399.11Cf. Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Der Gott von Delphie und die Humanitäts-Idee (Pfullingen: Neske,1965).195