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to beings of the same nature. But this does not mean that what determines the location ofthe transcendental is not a being at all. Rather, it leads directly to the problem: What isthe kind of Being of the being in which ‘world’ is constituted? That is the central problemof Being and Time; that is, a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It tries to show that thekind of Being belonging to human Dasein is totally different from that of other beings . . .and consequently contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.” 9When intentional analysis is carried through to its end, Heidegger argues, the being ofthe intentional object, the intentional act, and the intentional subject are brought into question.“To the intentionality of perception belongs not only the intentio and the intentum,but also the understanding of the Being of that which is intended in the intentum.” 10What is the being of the being that is constituted by intentionality? How does it differfrom other beings? What do these multiple ways of being indicate about the meaning ofbeing itself? “Phenomenological questioning in its innermost tendency itself leads to thequestion of the being of the intentional and before anything else to the question of themeaning of being as such.” (GA20 136)Rather than exploring the differences between the being of the intentio and the beingof every intentum Husserl imposes upon consciousness a notion of being derived from thedomain of objects: consciousness is “immanent being” by contrast to “transcendent being,”“absolute being,” by contrast to “contingent being,” “constituting being,” by contrast to“constituted being,” “pure being” by contrast to “individuated being.” The predicates“immanent,” “absolute,” “constituting,” and “pure” are not determinations drawn from thebeing of intentionality, but hyperbolic extrapolations from the domain of objectified being.Husserl had not remained true to his own principles; he had defined the phenomenologicaltheme “not out of the matters themselves but instead out of a traditional prejudgment ofit.” (GA20 128) Intentionality indicates an essential ambiguity in the notion of being, theunthematized divergent ways in which beings can be. Yet because Husserl’s bracketsexclude ontological considerations, this ambiguity cannot be engaged. “It [Husserl’sphenomenology] disregards not only reality but also any particular individuation of livedexperiences. It disregards the fact that acts are mine or those of any other individualhuman beings and regards them only in their what. It regards the what, the structureof the acts, but as a result does not thematize their way to be, their being an act as such.”(GA20 152/109-10)The questioning of the being of the intentional thrusts reflective phenomenology intocrisis. Being cannot be accessed through direct examination of conscious acts; it demandsan interpretive method that works with indirect manifestations and hidden meanings. Thehistorical self, who always already understands being, is not a “transcendental ego”; itdoes not reflectively possess itself a priori, but only encounters itself insofar as it enactsits pre-comprehension in living.Heidegger’s Return to the Fore-TheoreticalFrom the beginning of his apprenticeship to Husserl (1919), Heidegger suspected that theeidetic reduction to pure intuition remains trapped in the tradition of privileging theoreticalseeing over concretely and historically embedded understanding. Where phenomenology9Heidegger, letter to Husserl of October 22, 1927, in Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of aPhenomenological Beginning (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1983), 95-6.10Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997); English: Basic Problems of Phenomenology,trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982), 71.268