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e able to know itself as such at the moment of its involvement, and that it requires thefield of ideality in order to become acquainted with and to prevail over its facticity.” 135One must not, to be sure, misconstrue the nature of this “ideality.” Essences are not“metaphysical entities” (see PriP, 10); they do not exist, Platonic-wise, in rem, nor, forthat matter, are they, as Husserl thought in his quasi-Platonism, things (of a quasi-sort)that can be directly intuited by means of an “eidetic insight” (Wesenschau). Everythingis always, inextricably, part of a larger process, and the essence of any historical courseof events is simply the way (Sosein) in which, in retrospective hindsight, i.e., narration orstory-telling, it appears to the story-teller to have unfolded: Wesen ist was gewesen ist, asHegel remarked. Essences are not things that can be “seen” or, faute de mieux, deduced;they are not mentalistic a priori (valid for all time) but are, rather, things of an “ideal”sort, which is to say (using the term “ideal” in a decidedly non-Husserlian sense) that theyare semantic, interpretive -- which is to say, also, imaginative -- constructs of what hasbeen and what, in light of a discernible pattern, is quite likely to be in the future. 136 Inshort, the essence of anything is not an object (of whatever sort) that can be “referred to”or “intuited”; an essence is nothing more than a function of the interpretive-definitionalstatements we may make in order to appease our desire for intelligibility by saying “what”something or other is. The “whatness” (quidditas) of things is thus a function of the wayin which, by means of language, we interpret them (for whatever purpose), and the“essential relationships” (Wesenszusammenhänge) between things (that metaphysiciansbelieve are simply “there,” waiting to be discovered) are a function of the particular pointof view with which we approach them. (The “correctness” of these points of view -- which,as Alfred Schütz observed, are never absolute but are always expressive of particularinterests, theoretical or practical, on our part -- is always a function of their usefulness,as James would say, in leading us profitably from one resting-place in the stream ofexperience to another.)The point I wish to stress in all this is that essences, so conceived, are the only meansby which we can prevail over our facticity (our lostness in the everyday world) so as tothink our own history; as Hannah Arendt, a student of both Heidegger and Karl Jaspers,would say, they are the means for revealing “the meaning of what otherwise would remainan unbearable sequence of sheer happenings.” 137 To allude to an ancient maxim (sapientiaest ordinare), the function of interpretation is precisely that of discerning, amid what isoften a welter of confusing detail, the non-apparent, yet essential, order or logic in things.It should of course go without saying that, being interpretive constructs, the “essences”we arrive at in this way are always (to use a Husserlian term) “inexact,” and are thusalways revisable in the light of further experience. It should also be noted that, althoughthese essences or eidè are not “metaphysical entities,” they are also not (as Husserl rightlyobserved) mere generalizations or “inductions,” in the empiricistic sense of the term, andthat, moreover, statistical analyses can never provide us with the essence of anything,since such analyses, in order to be meaningful, must always be interpreted in a suitable135See also Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on Husserl’s notion of eidetic insight in his “Phenomenologyand the Sciences of Man.” (PriP, 54-55 and passim) In this lecture course Merleau-Ponty states that “aknowledge of facts always implies a knowledge of essences.” (PriP, 67)136Being semantic constructs, “essences,” like all concepts, have (as Gadamer pointed out [TM,428ff]), their origin in the metaphorizing-analogizing imagination, and they are “validated” not by logicaldemonstration but by rhetorical persuasion (on the intimate relation between hermeneutics and rhetoric,see my The Politics of Postmodernity, chap. 4; on the heuristic and cognitive function of metaphor, seemy Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatic Analysis [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982]).137Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1968), 104.41