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absolute lawgiver to any possible “world,” i.e., to any consistent structure of transcendentphenomenality that can possibly be given to pure consciousness. 13 In this sense, Husserl’spoint of view is even more radical than ancient dualism: for him, the “world,” from whichtranscendental subjectivity has to be distinguished, includes not only the whole of thematerial or cosmological universe but also the “ideal” sphere of intelligible -- i.e., mathematicalor logical -- objects, as long as their specific form of “existence” or “givenness”is naively presupposed without being recognized as a product of the spontaneity of theknowing subject. 14 Therefore, the “world,” in which theoretical subjectivity always riskslosing itself, does not coincide with the sum of all “external,” material things; it ispotentially present also within the sphere of subjectivity itself, under the disguise of animmanent, ideal transcendence detached from the source of its phenomenal sense.The More-Than-Theoretical Dimension of the Transcendental AttitudeDespite the apparently epistemological context of this issue, Husserl defines theparticularity of transcendental phenomenology in terms that cannot be derived from a mereradicalization of fundamental scientific concepts. The “bracketing off” (Einklammerung)of the world and the empirical subject is much more than a temporary methodologicalstratagem that could be abandoned once transcendental phenomenology has accomplishedthe task of creating a new and definitive foundation for knowledge. 15 If undertaking thisradical modification of attitude is a free -- and, to a certain degree, perhaps even an“irrational” -- decision, 16 then, once the epoché has been carried out, it has eliminatednot only the general thesis of our worldly existence, but also the very possibility of a realand not only fictitious return to the “naïve,” pre-transcendental attitude. 17 In most cases,the sciences and a non-phenomenological philosophy can and will continue to progressin profound ignorance of the innermost sense of their own activities, but one cannotrealize the possibility of a radically different approach to reality as given by the epochéand go on persisting in this innocent naïvety. The obligation imposed by the epoché is asineluctable as its breakthrough into individual scientific and philosophical existence is rare.One is free, not to take this step, but taking it amounts to an existential change that iscomparable to a religious conversion. 18While drawing a clear distinction between practical wisdom and faith, on the one hand,and transcendental phenomenology on the other hand, 19 Husserl employs a terminologythat reveals the quasi-religious dimension of phenomenological existence itself, incomparison with the pre-transcendental scientific attitude. Doing science in the “natural13Ibid., 105-106, § 49, and Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Hua XVII (TheHague: Nijhoff, 1974), 243-244.14See Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie, 337, § 145.15Ibid., 64, § 31.16Ibid., 63-64.17Of course, Husserl does not pretend that the transcendental philosopher has to abstain from all actsand decisions required by the different non-transcendental aspects of his everyday-life (e.g., as a husband,father, citizen, etc.), but he will play all these roles in a second-level attitude, that is, “as if” he were notradically, and once and for all, committed to the particular profession of transcendental philosopher. SeeEdmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,Hua VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954), 139.18Ibid., 140.19See Husserl, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” 49-59, and Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinenPhänomenologie, 109-110; 124-125, § 51. 58.224