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or is not existence something that can be predicated of this ‘that’? the question doesnot seem to suggest any answer to itself, not even a negative answer. But this wouldprove simply that the question had been badly put, that it was, if I may say so, a viciousquestion. It was vicious for two reasons: because the ‘I’ cannot in any case whatsoeverbe treated as a ‘that’, because the ‘I’ is the very negation of the ‘that’ whatsoever andalso because existence is not a predicate, as Kant seems to have established once andfor all, in the Critique of Pure Reason. 39Marcel stresses two points here. The first one is that the I is not a that, it is not a“mental object.” Of course, Marcel is not denying the possibility of thinking the I andtreating it as an object, as a psychologist could do, when writing an essay about “psychologicaldisorders of the I,” for example. To be honest, we are talking about the I as a mentalobject even in this moment. What Marcel wants to emphasize is that if I ask the question“Do I exist?,” I cannot consider my I as an object and, if I do this, what I am doingis a mere fiction. In other words, if I consider the I as an object within this question, I amnot talking about my I, in fact, rather, I am talking about a concept.The second point stressed by Marcel is that existence is not a predicate. I cannot conceivethe existence without the I -- or, better, without my I -- in any case.This is also the reason why Marcel strongly criticizes Descartes and the argument ofcogito. Marcel sees, in this argument, the danger of a dissociation between the gnoseologicalsubject, as an organ of an objective knowledge, and the vital element in our being.In other words, Marcel emphasizes the sum rather than the cogito; we cannot dissect theaffirmation “I am,” because it refers to existence, and we argued that it is impossible totreat it correctly when using the traditional rational categories. 40Therefore, we established that “I exist” and that existence is, so to say, an “opaquedatum.” The reason why, according to Marcel, we cannot use the rational in a scientificsense instrument to analyze it, is that existence is not a problem: it is a mystery. In Beingand Having, Marcel explains: “A problem is something which I meet, which I find completelybefore me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and reduce. But a mystery issomething in which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as asphere where the distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaningand initial validity.” 41Thus, Having is the way to solve the problems I find in the world. But what is Being?We could answer, in a speculative way, that it is the way to treat the mysteries I find inlife, but this does not seem to help very much. First of all, we have to say that Being issomething which deals with the notion of existence. In which sense? As a matter of factwe cannot use a rational, analyzing, dissecting, isolating language, we have to resort toa metaphor, so we can say that Being is the light and beings are illuminated by thislight. 42It is interesting to note that Marcel adopts a “simpler” and “more concrete” solutionthan Heidegger’s one, about the relationship between Being and beings. 43 One could also39Ibid., 90.40Marcel, Position et approches concrètes, 264-5. See also Luigi Pareyson, Studi sull’esistenzialismo(Milano: Mursia, 2002), 184.41Marcel, Being and Having, 117.42See Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel (Paris: Éditions Aubier-Montaigne, 1968).43The relationship between Marcel and Heidegger is a very interesting topic, and it would deservea larger treatment. According to Marcel, “this difficult philosopher, [i.e., Heidegger] is without doubt themost profound of our time, but the least capable of formulating anything resembling clear directions whichcould orient effectively the youth that turns to him as a guide.” Gabriel Marcel, L’Homme problématique,61