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things, we shall comprehend by intuition and intuit by comprehending.” 41 In the nextlecture course, he would refer to philosophy as a hermeneutic phenomenology, 42 and in1923 as a hermeneutics of facticity. 43 Heidegger’s terminological modification throughouthis courses is to be understood in the following way: originary science is not science,because it is not a founded knowledge. Instead, it refers to the comprehending andfounding attitude, that is, to hermeneutics. 44It is important that special attention be paid here to a possible misunderstanding.Apprehending a given science as non-theoretic-cognitive must not be understood as arejection of a theory of knowledge. It rather places a theory of knowledge within itsdetermined main feature: it is derivative. The possibility of an originary a-theoreticalscience hence shows that “Whatever be theoretical in itself always refers to the pretheoretical.”45Heidegger’s aim is precisely to free pre-theoreticality or a-theoreticality from the rule ofthe theoretical: “This rule ought to be broken…,” but this then also needs another openingof realms that had remained untouched up to that point. The realm of life-experiences inthe surrounding world as a realm of science, can’t be opened in a theoretical fashion, onlyaccording to the life experience in itself. Originary science as such and its research fieldcan’t be reached in a theoretical way, neither transcendental nor pre-transcendental. Onlyby comprehending, that is, hermeneutically, can it be accessed. In the 1920 summersemester, Heidegger outlined this matter more clearly: “This explaining and determiningthe essence of philosophy (as originary science) shouldn’t be apprehended as a taskperformed by knowledge, as a content result, but rather in a performative fashion.” 46Here we can see the contrast between philosophy as an originary and pre-theoreticalscience and philosophy as a strict science. We’ve shown that what makes up the scientificaspect of strict sciences in Husserl can be summed up in three main features: cognitive,theoretical, and transcendental. Philosophy as a strict science in Husserl is mainly seen asa transcendental theoretic-cognitive science.Heidegger saw beyond these features, by radically overturning the scientific characterof science while discovering its originary pre-theoretic-hermeneutic field of work.Philosophy as an originary science in Heidegger must always be a hermeneutic and pretheoreticscience.c) The Object of ScienceIf our starting point is to be scientifically determined in its own way, then thefollowing questions arise: Shouldn’t every science have its own object of research? And,were that to be the case, what happens then to originary science? What shall be its objectand how shall the way it is bound to its object be understood? Can we still talk aboutobjects proper if we set our eyes on the origin of the theoretic-cognitive object-making(vergegenständlichen). Grounded on what we have so far worked upon, it must be thussaid that it is not possible to speak of objects regarding originary science, inasmuch aswhatever it is that ought to be our research subject, it is that in which we always findourselves: namely, life itself. The latter cannot name any object in the theoretic-cognitive41GA58, 19ff.42GA56/57, 131.43GA63, 14ff.44We should understand what Heidegger stated in the 1919–20 winter semester in the followingway: “originary science is in no way a strict science. It is, indeed, philosophy.” GA58, 230.45GA56/57, 59.46GA59, 8.282