The Oversight of Life’s OneselfThe methodological-scientistic concerns that became pr<strong>ed</strong>ominant since the seventeenthcentury overlook<strong>ed</strong> the fact that form<strong>ed</strong> consciousness (Bildung) over<strong>com</strong>es all naturalsense, since, while the latter is always limit<strong>ed</strong> by a certain sphere, consciousness “operatesin all directions and, as such, is a general sense.” 21 It is within a (formative) preunderstandinghorizon that the Greek paideia is found in the “visual-objective model ofexternality (spatiality),” 22 i.e., in the model of the thing, 23 in which the categories ofspatiality and temporality are inherent in the thing itself. The classic visual-objectivemodel of the thing restricts reflective consciousness to the factum and its exact observation;science is the measure of all knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge where space and time are exclusively asystem of coordinates for accessing exact and accurate clues about all things. At ananthropological level, this model turn<strong>ed</strong> the concepts of logos and space into the <strong>com</strong>monplacesbetween the “world” of nature (the external, the physical) and the “world” ofculture (the internal, the reflective consciousness). Man is since seen as an (objectifiable)corporal or biological thing, as a sum, a “pure object of the physical or external world,something that can be touch<strong>ed</strong> and objectifi<strong>ed</strong>, i.e., a body <strong>com</strong>parable to that of ananimal yet specifically different from it because it is endow<strong>ed</strong> with something that animalsdo not have, the logos or the nous.” 24 The Western model of man, for which Christianityis strongly responsible as the heir of the platonic concept of the body as a “passingcondition of the soul,” 25 introduces a deeper and more radical distinction 26 : “Flesh andspirit are not anthropologically constitutive elements of the human entity but rather waysof being of man in his referral to divinity. Man ... is not an amalgamation of two <strong>com</strong>pletelydifferent substances but a single incarnate subject.” 27The crisis in the sciences after the seventeenth century is the crisis of culture (paideia),a crisis of existence brought about by the hyper-development that the Galilean legacygenerat<strong>ed</strong>, with the subsequent multiplication of increasingly specialist knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge, of newmethodologies which open<strong>ed</strong> up new horizons, but whose premises or conditions he didnot theorize: the geometrical-mathematical legibility of the universe requires a transcendentalperformance of consciousness, an act of the spirit creating something that did notexist before. 28 The ideality of Galilean science, which translates into forms and essences,is bas<strong>ed</strong> upon a “seeing,” as the sum total of the senses, which operates in a phenomenologicalhorizon: it reflects on an exterior world, a pure exteriority, since matter is resextensa and only knows idealities if they are present<strong>ed</strong> before its very eyes: “The geometricdeterminations to which Galilean science tries to r<strong>ed</strong>uce the being of things areidealities. These, far from being able to account for the sensory, subjective and relativeworld in which our daily activity takes place, necessarily refer to this world of life; it isonly in relation to this world that they have a meaning; it is on the insurmountable groundof this world that they are built.” 2921Hans-Georg Gadamer, Verdad y método, trans. Ana Agud Aparicio and Rafael de Agapito(Salamanca: Sigueme), 47.22Silva, “Corpo Vivido: do corpo-objecto ao corpo-consciente,” 58.23Cf. Martin Heidegger, Qu’est-ce qu’une chose? (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 16-18.24Silva, “Corpo Vivido: do corpo-objecto ao corpo-consciente,” 58.25Ibid., 60.26Juan Marias, El Tema del Hombre. Antologias Filosoficas I (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1989), 16.27Silva, “Corpo Vivido: do corpo-objecto ao corpo-consciente,” 60.28Edmund Husserl, La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale, trans.Gérard Granel (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 110f.29Henry, La Barbarie, 18.156
Experience cannot be conceiv<strong>ed</strong> as an effect; a reality cannot happen other than to theextent that it provides a sense and a consciousness. Scientific idealities always refer, therefore,to a sense-giving consciousness. This sense can exist in itself in axiomatic systems,yet to possess a value of knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge in the so-call<strong>ed</strong> real world it has to go through theworld-of-life, the sensitive world. In other words, as idealities, the geometric and mathematicaldeterminations imply subjective operation, a transcendental consciousness, a principlewhich, as it continually engenders the world of science, is a permanent condition forits own possibility: “The transcendental condition of the possibility of the experience ingeneral is the condition of science itself.” 30 Continuing on the basis of a technologicalhyper-development, scientific knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge invad<strong>ed</strong> the entire field of the logos, of praxis 31and culture with an exclusive claim on truth, and its effects on the notions of the world,subjectivity and life often went unnotic<strong>ed</strong> or were not thought through: “To the extent towhich culture is the culture of life and pertains to it exclusively, the science that keepsthis life and its specific development out of its subject matter, which is culture itself, remainswell and truly alien to it. The relationship between science and culture is a relationshipof mutual exclusion. … By eliminating … the world-of-life and life itself, science placesitself paradoxically outside the latter and its development, and consequently outside allpossible culture.” 32 Culture has originally, in itself, nothing to do with science and doesnot ensue from it. Life, in turn, is not to be taken as the object of scientific knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge:“The relation to the object is the vision of the object, whether it is the sensory vision ofthe sensory object or the intellectual vision of an intelligible object. … Now, the knowl<strong>ed</strong>gecontain<strong>ed</strong> in the vision of the object is not in the least exhaust<strong>ed</strong> in the knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of theobject. It means the knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of the vision itself, which is no longer consciousness, theintentional relation to the object, but life.” 33 But if objective sciences have understoodnothing about life, 34 human sciences, for their part, have r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> man to an automaton. 35An example of this is the temptation of modern neurosciences and cognitive sciences tor<strong>ed</strong>uce thought and ideas to the objective body in which the possibility of excess of thequestion of sense is always present<strong>ed</strong> as an illusion. Philosophy does not escape thiseither, as in the form of a classic transcendental phenomenology it does not know anymanifestation other than that produc<strong>ed</strong> within the world 36 : “When subjectivity is nothing30Ibid., 104.31Michel Henry defines praxis in the following way: “Le savoir de la vie <strong>com</strong>me savoir où la vieconstitue à la fois le pouvoir qui connaît et ce qui est connu par lui procurant, de façon exclusive, son«contenu», je l’appelle praxis. … En tant que la culture est la culture de la vie et repose sur le savoirpropre de celle-ci, elle est essentiellement pratique.” Ibid., 37-38.32Ibid., 102-103.33Ibid., 27.34“L’illusion de Galilée <strong>com</strong>me de tous ceux qui, à sa suite, considèrent la science <strong>com</strong>me un savoirabsolu, ce fut justement d’avoir pris le monde géométrique, destiné a fournir une connaissance univoqu<strong>ed</strong>u monde réel, pour ce monde réel lui-même, ce monde que nous ne pouvons qu’intuitionner et éprouverdans les modes concrets de notre vie subjective.” Ibid., 19.35“Les ‘sciences de l’esprit’, ou, <strong>com</strong>me on dit aujourd’hui, les ‘sciences humaines’ n’ont doncaucune autonomie, elles ne constituent pas le symétrique des sciences de la nature, leurs recherches apparaissentprovisoires, vouées tôt ou tard à céder la place à un autre savoir, celui qui, délaissant la réalitépsychique, c’est-à-dire le niveau de l’expérience humaine, s’oriente vers ses soubassements cachés, soitl’univers des molécules et des atomes.” Ibid., 17.36The clearing (Lichtung) where human existence is truly human (ex-sistence), while belonging tothe world, is entirely dominat<strong>ed</strong> by the “dimensional ek-static” (dimensional ekstatique) which defines the“phenomenality of the world as such.” Michel Henry, La Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Paris: Puf,2003), 6. The idea of “world” as the fundamental place of all appearance (the conception of the light ofthe world as a transcendental condition for all manifestation) constitut<strong>ed</strong> for Michel Henry the greatestobstacle to a true understanding of Christianity and revelation.157
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-