[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

Philosophy does not merely participate externally in the process humanity’sdevelopment, of that which is instrumental in the ‘becoming’ of humanity (at least asregards European humanity). A person becomes the “I” on the basis of the philosophicalquestion: who am I? This question accompanies our everyday activities, sometimesexplicitly, but for the most part implicitly. It is impossible for me to give a definitiveanswer to this question, since I respond to it and can only answer it while becoming whatI am. I must somehow go beyond myself, transcend myself, not in an arbitrary directionbut rather exactly up to my “I am.” The factual and existential concern of my own “I am”pushes me beyond my everyday experience, beyond my self-knowledge. I try to “takerefuge” in the arts, religion and philosophy. Every transcendental project for itself -- asa product of a certain culture -- and all these concepts together form the concept of tradition,which we accept or not, and which decides the way in which we will comprehendourselves.If we argue around this line, then the following objection quickly overtakes us, namelythat we want to adopt a transcendental and speculative procedure, on which basis thephilosophy of “I” in German idealism principally developed, instead of using anempirically verifiable approach in order to address the question of ‘mankind.’ To someextent, we can find this question embedded in Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. Thedispute between empiricism and transcendentalism still characterizes the actual philosophicaldiscussion about the nature of humans, not only in its Anglo-Saxon expression,but also within its Continental aspect. This dispute, however, does not even comeanywhere near to a sensible answer to the question: Who am I? The question regardingman cannot be theoretically tracked down appropriately in this way, inasmuch as wepursue our mental states or lower ourselves down to their level from the higher entity ofa supra-empirical “I.” In my factual life situation, I am never a “mental state” or an“abstract I.” These are only theoretical constructions. In theory, the question “Who am I?”is only attainable within one’s life experience. This life experience is, phenomenologicallyspeaking, the experience of the living-world (Lebenswelt). The question “Who am I?” isswitched by its being close to the living-world, i.e., it directly belongs to a possiblefulfillment in one’s life in this world. The ‘becoming’ of man, regarding the humanbeing’s reply to his or her self-questioning, cannot be confined to the simple affirmationof the “I” and of consciousness, as it really represents the affirmation of the world, whichpresents itself to human beings as the answer to their question. This is one of the mostbasic “theoretical” premises of phenomenology in Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Fink andGadamer.As a result, phenomenology developed into a “theory” in the sense of a theoreticalanticipation of the practical experience which remains close to the living-world. Thus,phenomenology affirms the ‘becoming’ of humans in the world. At this stage, however,we meet a major problem. The negation of this affirmation, barely noticeable, sneaks pastthe philosophical will and the demands of phenomenology as a rigorously constructed,wee-grounded philosophy of the living-world. Its outcome, i.e., results such as politicaltotalitarianism, the Cold War, nuclear threats, global environmental pollution, etc., confersupon this negation a discernible, almost tangible magnitude. The negation of the humanliving-world is no longer a mere specter, issuing from some philosophical nightmare. The“European nihilism” à la Nietzsche, the European humanity à la Husserl, the forgetfulnessof Being à la Heidegger, these are components of the reality, which we live and experience.As such, we must partake in it. However, the question remains as to how thisnegation, which we embody, is to be understood. We could dismiss it, put it aside andbehave as if it had never been asked and as if it was nothing to us. By acting thus, weappear to prefer avoiding the possibility of becoming discountenanced by it. One can,indeed, notice a certain uneasiness among humans!193