[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

The next question is, how should one characterize the “meaning of Being.” In order toanswer this question, one would first have to ask another: what is “Dasein ‘understands’Being” supposed to mean? If Dasein were not to understand Being in the way in whichhe understands the statements of others, or the meaning of any cultural product, or any‘thing’ in the world, etc., then in what would his understanding of Being consist?Dasein understands Being, not in the sense of being open to some concretely identifiable“meaning” of Being, but in the sense of being open to the endless horizon of meaning,that is, to that which makes his understanding possible. Dasein’s understanding of Beingdoes not consist in the recognition, in Being, of any “concrete” meaning and, as a resultof this, in the putting forward of a definition for this meaning. It consists, rather, inDasein’s openness to what made all interpretations of Being in human history possible,even though they may well not yet have been identified as such.Consequently the only thing that the phenomenologist can do, is to clarify the veryrelationship that holds Dasein together with Being. Phenomenological description assumesthe form of an analytic of Dasein, in which latter Heidegger discloses the existential structuresthat underlie (and make possible) a circular relationship between Dasein and Being.This is not yet the interpretation of what Dasein understands as the “meaning” of Being --which still remains the presumed goal of the analytic of Dasein -- but the exploration ofthe consecutive “conditions of possibility” that underlie the understanding of Being byDasein. One could say, then, that Heidegger explores, in his analytic of Dasein, the verystructure of the circular relationship in which Dasein remains with Being and thus makespossible Dasein’s understanding of anything at all.Heidegger’s assertion, that Being appears “from itself,” now means that it appearsalways in light of the a priori relationship of Dasein to it, i.e., of its “standing open” inBeing as openness. Thus Being is not originally experienced by Dasein as a particular, ideal“object,” describing it from the distinct and “subjective” position of the transcendental ego(as does Husserl). Rather, Being is always already “given” to Dasein as the “thing” Daseinis open to, a priori, and as what constitutes him in his “standing open” in this ‘thing.’ Inthis sense, the phenomenological “description” of the relationship as an apprehension ofthe showing (appearance) of Being “from itself,” does not mean that the one who describesBeing has -- literally -- changed over to its side. It only means that the phenomenologisttries to explore the pre-ontological structure of Dasein’s a priori relationship toBeing from the perspective of his or her own finitude.One can say, then, that Heidegger’s concept of phenomenological description/interpretation differs from Husserl’s in three essential respects. First, it differs in theconception of the descriptive method, secondly in the understanding of the position of thephenomenologist toward the described “thing,” and thirdly in the understanding of thevery nature of the described “thing.” However, there is still one fundamental assumptionthat is common to both philosophers, and it is the postulate concerning the description ofthings simply as they appear to the one who describes them. Yet again, when one takesa closer look at how they both understand this postulate, there is a fourth essentialdifference to be noted. According to Heidegger, phenomenological description cannot just‘happen’ after the phenomenologist has given up his or her thesis concerning the existenceof the world, as if it were only then possible to explore the “essential” way of givenness(die Gegebenheit) of things as they appear in this world. On the contrary, it is preciselythe fact of Dasein’s “being thrown” (“thrownness”) into the world that is the most originalphenomenon, which the phenomenologist needs must take as his or her starting-point forthe description.For, this “fact” -- unlike the concept of fact as understood by the positivist -- hasnothing empirical in itself. Rather, it has the status of unquestionable evidence, since italways “precedes” Dasein in his relation to himself and to the outside world. In this sense,253