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We now need to quote a second, well-known Heideggerian saying: “Rather, language isthe house of Being, in which the human being ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to thetruth of Being, guarding it.” 16 This saying implies that language is not a medium that isseparate from Being, a medium in which Being is expressed, but that it is Being itself thatoccurs in language. In other words, language, as the house of Being, is the occurrence ofBeing, since it is only in language that Being appears and stays preserved. As a result, thefabric of language-with-Being as occurrence calls for a different type of “description” thanthat which is still dominant in Being and Time. This new type of description -- as the demonstration(die Aufzeigung) of the thing from itself -- assumes the form of a permanentmeta-phorization of Being in language. This results in the tendency to “poetize” thelanguage used in the “description” of Being, a tendency that increases apace and becomes,in its turn, dominant in Heidegger’s late works.At this point, we should not forget that the term “description,” when used to describeBeing as an occurrence enjoys quite a different status from that accorded to it by Husserl’sphenomenological description of the “thing itself.” The aim of the former “description”is neither to make the “thing” originally visible, nor to clarify it by interpretation. It is,rather, to transform the very description into an ‘occurrence,’ so that the “thing” comesto light in its very occurrence. Accordingly, the phenomenological description assumes aperformative character. It realizes in itself what in Being and Time still appeared as themere horizon of language (which makes possible the description/interpretation of anythingat all). In this sense, Heidegger does not abandon the idea of phenomenological description,but realizes it in its most radical form: as a factual description of “the thing fromitself.”The idea of phenomenological description as formulated in Being and Time thus comesto a transforming climax in Heidegger’s work after the “turn.” The description of the“thing from itself” emerges as the ‘thing’s self-presentation,’ that is, it has been transformedinto the thing’s direct occurrence in words. Differently expressed, phenomenologicaldescription has become a direct “activity” of the thing itself. It is, literally, the thing itselfwhich calls phenomenological description into being. We are not speaking only of a particularfusion between phenomenological description and Being itself, as the new characteristicof the philosophical language used by the later Heidegger. We are now speakingof the transformation of the very “description” into the occurrence itself of Being. Consequently,the early Husserlian idea of phenomenology as a “descriptive science” hasmetamorphosed into phenomenology as a “performative science,” in which the descriptionof Being becomes the occurrence of Being itself in the process of being expressed.Phenomenology has become language, and language comes into being in the veryoccurring of Being.16Heidegger, Pathmarks, 254; idem, Wegmarken, 330: “Vielmehr ist die Sprache das Haus des Seins,darin wohnend der Mensch eksistiert, indem er der Wahrheit des Seins, sie hütend, gehört.”258
4. HUSSERL’S “GOD”Jan SochońMan can only derive empathy from his own place,from his cognitive and sentimental horizons, andwith this shape the ways of faith.Edmund Husserl 1Initial RemarksI begin by referring to the book De Consolatione Philosophiae, by Anicius M. S. Boethius. 2He wrote this book at a special and tragic point in his life, that is, when he had unexpectedlybeen charged with participating in a conspiracy against King Theodoric, wasidentified as godless and was condemned to death. His death occurred, probably, in theyear 525. While imprisoned in Pavia (Italy) and waiting to be executed, Boethius tried toexamine his own existential situation, calling for aid on a lady with “bright [and] glowingeyes,” namely philosophy. She, ignoring all circumstances, chased away the Muses oflyric poetry from Boethius’s side, calling them “harlots” and “mermaids” who would onlyadd to his suffering, and decided, by herself, to be the one who would take Boethius outof the sickness named coma, i.e., Plato’s oblivion of oneself. Her therapy brought aboutthe intended effect. Boethius, having listened to philosophy’s arguments, concluded thatthe essence of happiness is to be found only in experiencing God; and, that philosophizingitself is not just a search for the ultimate good, which is God, but also a step towardpreparing for a dignified experience of death. Therefore, philosophy includes the functionof consoling and bringing alleviation to human beings.Could Boethius’s experience be repeated now, when philosophy has been transformedto such an extent? Karol Tarnowski noted, in his essay about The Consolation of Art, thatphilosophy today consoles hardly anybody any more, mainly because our contemporaryculture has entered the so-called “postmetaphysical” phase. And although the questionsthat gave rise to metaphysics as philosophy have not disappeared -- questions, which canbe defined as “metaphysical” in a broad sense and concern the deepest sense of the humanbeing in the world -- something worse has happened. On the one hand, the answers tothese questions, expressed in the spirit of the Western rational optimism, are no longersatisfactory, and on the other, the basic key to a metaphysical intuition of reality has beenlost. 3 In spite of this, I still believe that philosophy is not something that belongs to a lostpast. It invariably stands a chance of expressing reality in some degree, unless deceivedby post-modern delusions or the perils of scepticism, provided that it trusts in experienceand the intellect. The latter has the power of approaching what is true, or even of reachingout to the transcendent and, as such, it can open up to Revelation, which is capable ofconsoling the mind.This is why it is necessary to reflect upon the “essence” of philosophy. The history ofculture proves the indispensability of philosophical tools in the process of formulating a1Edmund Husserl, Kryzys europejskiego człowieczeństwa a filozofia, trans. Janusz Sidorek (Warszawa:Aletheia, 1993), 100.2Boecjusz, O pocieszeniu, jakie daje filozofia, trans. Mikołaj Olszewski (Warszawa: PWN, 1962).See also Boecjusz, Traktaty teologiczne, trans. Roman Bielak and Agnieszka Kijewska (Kęty: Antyk,2001); Lambros Couloubaritsis, Histoire de la philosophie ancienne et médiévale. Figures illustres (Paris:Bernard Grasset, 1998), 819-836.3Karol Tarnowski, “O pocieszeniu, jakie daje sztuka,” in Józef Lipiec, ed., Wielkość i pięknofilozofii (Kraków: Collegium Columbinum, 2002), 317.259
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
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only as a place made for oneself as
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III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
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consolidated by terming it an “un
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If our analysis is correct, the “
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The esthesiology of the senses of t
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in certain cases, together with the
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what the touched hand recognizes wh
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heart; a presence where a lived tak
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conceives it, not on the basis of n
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Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
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out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
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God creates, or better, draws, a
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the “there,” the “one same sp
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free to function more purely as a p
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close grasp of the sleight of the h
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understood both as discursive thoug
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While Henry thus questions “the m
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is able to persist in the undergoin
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“remember,” but not as I would
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intentionally structured self-consc
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life can ultimately be defined in i
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4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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and the represented body (the combi
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Page 214 and 215: Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
Page 216 and 217: 3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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Page 236 and 237: In clear distantiation from his own
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Page 250 and 251: stood “from itself.” As a resul
Page 252 and 253: makes possible the further interpre
Page 254 and 255: of Being -- already grown into Bein
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Page 258 and 259: into the openness of Being, it diff
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Page 264 and 265: Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
Page 266 and 267: And this proved, probably, to be a
Page 268 and 269: Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
Page 270 and 271: to beings of the same nature. But t
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Page 274 and 275: According to Aristotle, intellectio
Page 276 and 277: 6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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Page 284 and 285: things, we shall comprehend by intu
Page 286 and 287: something,’ is not merely there (
Page 288 and 289: epoché in Husserl become a hermene
Page 290 and 291: When Heidegger characterizes world-
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