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attempt at unification, the reflective process would in reality still remain at the primarystage, since it would remain a prisoner in the hands of the very oppositions which it,itself, had in the first instance postulat<strong>ed</strong>, instead of calling the ultimate validity of theseoppositions into question.” 56 Therefore, second degree reflection does not represent aflight into a kind of irrationalism or mysticism. 57 Second degree reflection makes use ofconcepts, but these concepts are expressions of concrete experience and are not formulat<strong>ed</strong>as abstract solution strategies to problems. Problems are inde<strong>ed</strong> problematic preciselybecause they arose from and remain within the “spirit of abstraction.”According to Marcel, existence should be seen in this way, because life is a mystery,not a problem. But what does it mean, in the concrete? It means that men have the taskof going beyond the problematic. And it means, at the same time, “a return to the imm<strong>ed</strong>iacyof liv<strong>ed</strong> experience, though on a higher level.” 58 Therefore, if first degreereflection can partially be identifi<strong>ed</strong> with the phenomenological method, second degreereflection can also be seen, in this light, as an attempt to develop second degree reflectionitself. Nevertheless, “Marcel never identifi<strong>ed</strong> phenomenology with his second reflection,which is essentially a metaphysical or ontological approach.” 59Second degree reflection is inde<strong>ed</strong> a return to the imm<strong>ed</strong>iacy of liv<strong>ed</strong> experience ona higher level; but it is also an ontological approach, because the concepts us<strong>ed</strong> in the firstdegree reflection are still there in the second degree reflection, but they are transform<strong>ed</strong>.They are not weaken<strong>ed</strong>; on the contrary, they are more concrete. From the instant inwhich first degree reflection appli<strong>ed</strong> to the real, to the instant in which I look back reflectingon that reflection, time has pass<strong>ed</strong>; and time has, paradoxically, made the conceptmore concrete, exactly as it has reveal<strong>ed</strong> its substantial fiction and fallibility. 60 In otherwords, time has produc<strong>ed</strong> an overturning of concept, eliminating its abstractness andrecovering its concreteness.Time and UniversalityThe conceptual space grant<strong>ed</strong> to second degree reflection is therefore a borderland,between the thoughts which practice solely and exclusively first degree reflection andignore the essence of man as a “being on the move,” an existent who lives in time, andthose nihilistic thoughts which, even if they recognize the Geworfenheit, in one way oranother, turn out in identifying the most authentic dimension of time in the future. ForMarcel, the dimension of plan (Entwurf) must not be reject<strong>ed</strong>; nevertheless, favoring thefuture always implies the risk that the plan “devours,” so to say, the existence which itshould address. In this case, the plan be<strong>com</strong>es the “postponement of existence to later”:56Ibid., 1: 93.57Evidence of the fact that Marcel never renounc<strong>ed</strong> the use of reason and of concepts is this: “heconsider<strong>ed</strong> the very term ‘intuition’ too dangerous and too load<strong>ed</strong> to call his metaphysical reflection‘reflective intuition,’ as he once contemplat<strong>ed</strong> doing.” Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 460.Nevertheless, the “reflective intuition” does not overlap, at a deeper sight, with the “second degreereflection.”58Ibid., 460.59Ibid.60A confirmation of this interpretation, bas<strong>ed</strong> on the centrality of the notion of time in the dynamicof second-degree reflection, can be found in the first part of Being and Having, and particularly in the not<strong>ed</strong>at<strong>ed</strong> March 6, 1929. In this regard, see also John V. Vigorito, “On Time in the Philosophy of Marcel,”in Schilpp and Hahn, <strong>ed</strong>., The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, 391-420. About the notion of time, broadlyconceiv<strong>ed</strong>, see the recent and illuminating work of Ugo Perone, Il presente possibile (Napoli: Guida,2005).65

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