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Phenomenology does not concern itself with knowledge as a temporal happening. Itdoes not handle knowledge as either a psychological or a psychophysical affair; what itwants is to clear up the idea of knowledge in terms of its constitutive elements and itslaws. . . it wants to raise pure forms of knowledge (and its pure laws) to a never-beforeachieved level of clarity and distinction, folding back to a plain, whole and fittingintuition. 19If phenomenology could reach the aforesaid clarity and distinction (clara et distinctaidea) through intuition, we must stress the fact that, for Husserl, such intuition would beapprehended reflexively, that is, it would be a reflexive intuition. In other words, the wayclarity and distinction are to be obtained is possible only by means of a reflective ‘objectmaking’(vergegenständlichen), through reflecting on it. Phenomenological clarity anddistinction are obtained during different levels of reflection. That is why a theoreticalcognitivefeature is found in that reflective ‘object-making’ aspect of Husserl’s intuition.Heidegger saw this key feature of Husserlian intuition very clearly, even in Husserl’s firstlectures. Inasmuch as this intuition grants knowledge, it was considered by Heideggerfrom the very beginning to be a theoretical intuition. 20It can be easily understood, from this perspective, why Husserl spoke about aphenomenology of knowledge, that is to say, a phenomenology “directed toward pure lifeexperiences and whatever meaning-constituents might belong to these.” 21 It is an eideticscience that goes after clarity and distinctiveness in theoretical knowledge through areflexive intuition (Anschauung). However, it will only unfold itself completely, findingits fundamental basis, through a final step: by discovering the transcendental realm basedon the epoché and the phenomenological reduction: “Only with a transcendentalphenomenologicalapproach can philosophy begin to develop as science in any laterscientific activities.” 22A further question can be justifiably asked at this point: How is knowledge --understood as a reflexive intuition (Anschauung) -- possible? Husserl says:If this pondering about the meaning of knowledge is to yield not ‘simple’ opinions, butrather, as we rigorously require here, intellectual awareness [Wissen], it must thereforebe carried out based only on both mental and cognitive experiences that are given tous [gegebener Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse]. 23Phenomenology’s strictly scientific features are a search for self-evidence in knowledge,which is given through intuition. According to the analysis that took place in the sixth LU,a knowledge-providing intuition is characterized as fulfillment. By ‘fulfillment,’ whatHusserl means is the act’s theoretic-cognitive essence. 24 As such, it might be implied19Hua XIX/1, A 21: “[Die Phenomenologie] will nicht die Erkenntnis, das zeitliche Ereignis, inpsychologischem order psychophysischem Sinn erklären, sondern die Idee der Erkenntnis nach ihrenkonstitutiven Elementen, bzw. Gesetzen aufklären [❼] die reinen Erkenntnisformen und Gesetze will siedurch Rückgang auf die adäquat erfüllende Anschauung zur Klarheit und Deutlichkeit erheben.”20What Heidegger mentioned in the KNS-lectures regarding the features of knowledge of theHusserlian point of view (GA56/57, 65) was formulated with greater clarity a few years later. Forexample, see GA21, 109. Heidegger mentioned that according to Husserl knowledge (Erkenntnis) isintuition (Anschauung).21Hua XIX/1, A 21.22Hua V, 147.23Hua XIX/1, A 19.24This theoretical-cognitive essence, which was worked upon in the 28th section of the sixth LogicalInvestigation, mustn’t be mistaken for intentional essence, which was developed by Husserl in the fifthLU. See also G. Heffernan, Bedeutung und Evidenz bei Edmund Husserl (Bonn: Bouvier, 1983).277